ISSN 0022-5231

JOURNAL OF THOUGHT

An Interdisciplinary Quarterly



Articles by:

Frank Kodman
Elmer H. Duncan
William H. Howick
Donald S. Seckinger
Lloyd P. Williams
David B. Owen
John Fizer
Richard Nelson
& Joseph Watras
Felix Friedberg

PUBLISHED BY
THE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION
THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

SPRING 1981

VOLUME 16 NUMBER 1

Journal of Thought

EDITOR

Chipman G. Stuart — University of Oklahoma

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Richard Wisniewski — University of Oklahoma
James J. Van Patten — University of Arkansas
John S. Catlin — University of Oklahoma
Lloyd P. Williams — University of Oklahoma

INTERNATIONAL EDITOR

Dragan D. Milivojevic — University of Oklahoma

BOARD OF REVIEW EDITORS

Clinton B. Allison — University of Tennessee
Virginia M. Atwood — University of Kentucky
John D. Pulliam — University of Oklahoma
Carlton Bowyer — Memphis State University
Sherry L. Schiller — Oakland Schools, Pontiac, MI
Paul F. Sharp — University of Oklahoma
Jo A. Leeds — University of North Carolina at Greensboro

EDITOR—SPECIAL TOPIC EDITION

Alanson A. Van Fleet — University of Tennessee

THE JOURNAL OF THOUGHT WAS FOUNDED IN 1966 BY JAMES J. VAN PATTEN

Contents

Journal of Thought Volume 16, Number 1 Spring 1981

		page
THE SCRIBE		
Frank Kodman	Academic Standards, Quality Education and Oil of Olay	3
CONTROVERSY		
Elmer H. Duncan	Existentialism, Pragmatism and Atheism: Rejoinder to Winetrout and Fisher	7
AUTHORS & ARTICLES		
William H. Howick	Major and Specific Current Problems in Higher Education	11
Donald S. Seckinger	Tentative Solutions to the Problems of Higher Education Today	19
Lloyd P. Williams	Conjectural Notes on the Future of Higher Education	27
David B. Owen	Can Higher Education Survive—A Critical Response	33
John Fizer	Whither Academia?	39
Richard Nelson & Joseph Watras	The Scientific Movement: American Education and the Emergence of the Technological Society	49
Felix Friedberg	Caveat Homo Sapiens: Reason and Unreason	73
BOOK REVIEWS		
W. Ross Palmer	The Sociology of Education by Ann Parker Parelius & Robert J. Parelius	83
Mitchell Aboulafia	Behavior Modification and "Punishment" of the Innocent: Towards a Justification of the Institution of Legal Punishment by George Schedler	85
Avraham Scherman	Reaching Out: Interpersonal Effectiveness and Self-actualization (second edition) by David W. Johnson	88
BOOKS RECEIVED		91
INDEX TO VOL. 15, 1–4		92

The *Journal of Thought* is a quarterly publication devoted to encouraging scholars of diverse disciplines, nationalities, languages and cultures to examine the significant educational issues and problems from the perspective of their various disciplines. The editors solicit material that treats the more comprehensive issues and problems confronting education throughout the world. Interdisciplinary dialogue among scholars is encouraged.

All correspondence, prospective articles, and books for review should be sent to the Editor, *Journal of Thought*, College of Education, the University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma 73019. Manuscripts must be submitted in triplicate, be typed and double-spaced, and be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope for their return. We suggest that authors use the *Manual of Style* (University of Chicago). Notes must be numbered consecutively at the end of the article.

Subscription rates per year are $8.00 domestic and $15.00 outside the U.S. Back issues are $2.00 per copy and may be obtained from the editor. *Special Topic* editions will vary in price.

The opinions and views expressed in the *Journal of Thought* are those of the individual authors and are not to be construed as the opinions of the Editors, the College of Education, or the University of Oklahoma.

Copyright 1981 by The University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma 73019 U.S.A.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the publisher.

The Scribe

Frank Kodman
Department of Psychology
Murray State University
Murray, Kentucky 42071

Academic Standards, Quality Education and Oil of Olay

Scholarly publications, too numerous to cite here, have alluded to the erosion of academic standards in academia. The problem continues to fester rather than disappear. Thus, it seemed appropriate to examine some of the issues involved in academic standards and quality education.

Etiology of Academic Erosion

In the early forties, research and clinical studies appeared extolling the premise that authoritarian parents were producing emotionally disturbed children and that the only solution to this problem was to eliminate or attenuate the rigorous demands made by this approach in the family and in the classroom. The end results of this assumption led to the "soft pap" now being served up to the sometimes reluctant student in academia. The underlying evils of the previously established standards were said to bring about severe emotional trauma, poor learning, poor quality education, poor accountability and even suicidal attempts. Egad! we certainly cannot have that. The remedy, said the educational administrator, is to therapize the learner, client-center the learner, love the learner, toilet train the learner, wean the learner gently from the breast to the classroom, feed him on a self-demand schedule and insulate him with nutrient fiberglass from the harsh and cruel realities of academe. This way and only this way can the learner avoid the fatal consequences of the dreaded authoritarian-oriented oedipal complex.

Liberation of Education

We have been informed by client-centered educators that we must eliminate the tormenting doubts of the learner, his concerns about love, sex, work, interpersonal relations, marriage, divorce, child rearing, and even loneliness, by yielding to this new technology of learning. We must succor, nurture, reinforce, stroke, insulate and protect him from the harsh realities of life and finally anoint him with the soothing effects of *oil of olay*. This heretical axiom by some leading educators refutes the very basis of rational-emotive precepts. Professorhood has become a nearcraft called *parenting*, a how-to-ism spewed out by child psychiatrists, child psychologists, parent educators, social workers, guidance counselors, and by the friends and family of the *educated* public. Some psychologists claim that bedwetting is an emotional difficulty aggravated by bad parenting or in our scheme, bad professorship. The prevalence of academic eneuresis, then, would seem to be traceable to academic trauma. What has gone before, is simply cast aside! Despite the newly developed doubts, the educational establishment still insists that the professor is the villain and his guilt is reflected in the student who is anxious, slow-learning, overactive, poorly behaved, alcohol indulged or drug addicted, emotionally disturbed. In other words, the professor has committed the modern crime of inexpert and insidious parenthood.

As the history of learning has shown, professors have been buffeted by the changing fads of the past century. In the 1890's, the professor was glorified as an ideal, and the esteemed professor of that day was one who had "good character" and set himself up as a model for the learner. By 1900, the experts had developed a new system—discipline, firmness, and the exercise of authority. Shame and ridicule were often the prime tools of the professor who was cautioned not to coddle or fondle the learner.

The next decades, the twenties, thirties, and forties, were destined to become the era of scheduled learning. Loving was considered important, but not so much love that it interfered with the learner's all-important schedule of achievement. John B. Watson, author of *Behaviorism*, was the prophet of this theory, and his concepts aped those underlying Marine boot-camp training. There is a sensible way of treating the learner, he stated, treat him as if he were an adult.

By the end of WWII, disciplined learning had been discredited, and the ensuing 30 years have been the heyday of permissiveness; an

attitude based on the theory that the learner knows *instinctively* what is best for him. In this psychological-learning care system of compliance, the learner is "blame-free" and it is the professor who is suspect. In one graceful psychological move, responsibility shifted from the learner to the professor; from self to others. The educational administrator now had a shield to hide behind and a weapon that he could wield against the faculty. Note the use of instructor evaluations both fall and spring semesters. How did we leave out the summer session evaluations! With the recent accountability trend, the administrator's cudgel was even more powerful. Now the administrator could say that his most important concern was the learner and the professor was the main culprit in the script entitled, "What is higher education?" The taxpayer and especially the parent seem eager to indict the professor and even suggest what his work schedule should be. If he is not in the process of teaching a class, he must be *loafing*.

The learning-care system is based on the psychodynamic theory that the uncaring professor forces the learner to repress his viable drives for self-actualization. In the process, fixations are created which later emerge as neurotic behavior in the personality *and* the vocational quality of the learner. Permissiveness now pervades the university scene conditioned by two generations of *soft pap* propaganda.

The result is an intimidated professor who often patronizes the learner, indulges him with pseudo-attention, superficial love and condescension. The professor thus constantly frets about the learner's precarious *emotional* state. The strongest skeptics of this *soft-pap* learning care system have been the hard-nosed, reality-oriented working man who knows well the value of the responsibility ethic. It is the *college-educated* parent who has become entranced with the psychodynamic learning approach. Modern, empirical research is now focusing finally on the ultimate issue—what has happened to individual responsibility? Is not the learner responsible for himself? Is he not free to make his own mistakes in spite of adverse circumstances? Has the learner become too self-conscious and too insecure about his learning and identity role? The hard core learning care model *supplies* the identity for the learner, but now the soft-pap loving care system shifted to the subservient professor. Ask yourself the question, "how can the learner identify with a weakened authority figure?"

The toil and travail of the learning process, the joy and exaltation of living up to a quality of expectation, the sheer ecstasy of survival and the emergence of competency is what the script is all about. *Veritas Valet Vitae*.

Professors who are permissive with the learner, are apparently not aware that the learner can and must identify with the strong ego of the professor until he can develop his own ego-learning system; assuming that he has not yet developed one. Exercising a form of authority over the learning process is a form of love just as important as the "giving love" endorsed by the client-centered teacher. Authority here should not be confused with authoritarianism. The simple fact is that the professor can function only as a source of reliable and conflicting ideation. The learning process is after all a mechanism whereby the student is exposed to ideas that are different from his own. Without this confrontation, life assumes a meaningless, and oogenic existence.

In the 70's, we are finally beginning to question the cliches of the past. Is "soft-pap" the proper approach? Is *oil of olay* the panacea for all students and the proper mode for higher education? With two generations of Rogerian ointment, have we made progress in solving the problems of disoriented persons? The hard facts are that we have produced a generation of confused, manipulative individuals who feel secure only when they identify with the 90 dB level of the rock musician and his schizophrenic-like stage behavior.

Controversy

Elmer H. Duncan
Department of Philosophy
Baylor University
Waco, Texas 76798

Existentialism, Pragmatism and Atheism: Rejoinder to Winetrout and Fisher

Some years ago, I read a paper at a professional meeting which was rather severely "worked over" by my assigned critic. On that occasion, a friend chided me, "You were clear enough to be found out." I took that to be a compliment; I still do. Unfortunately, my recent paper, "American Pragmatism and French Existentialism: Some Comparisons and Contrasts,"[1] was not as clear as it should have been. And this lack of clarity has led to an interesting response by Kenneth Winetrout and William H. Fisher.[2] I appreciate their comments, and feel that many of their complaints are completely justified, but I also think that there are a couple of passages in which *they* also weren't as clear as they should have been.

But to get down to cases, I should have thought it was fairly standard practice to take one philosopher (or maybe two) to represent an entire group. Thus I should have thought it proper to talk about American pragmatism, using John Dewey as an example (or a paradigm case), or to talk about French existentialism using Jean-Paul Sartre as an example. This is, of course, *not* to say that John Dewey was the only American pragmatist who ever said or wrote anything philosophically worthwhile, though Winetrout and Fisher accuse me of having fallen into this "trap." On this charge I plead "not guilty." But I should add that this practice seems to me permissible *only* in so far as we're clear about what we're doing, and I wasn't. In an early draft of my paper, I had a sentence (later deleted for no good reason)

in which I said that by the French Existentialists, I intended Sartre, Camus and de Beauvoir; *that* was the group I was talking about. But I deleted that sentence, and thus when I wrote "The French existentialists are atheists, and Dewey was an atheist, too . . .," I laid myself open to the obvious objection that Gabriel Marcel, to cite only one example, was not an atheist. That was stupid of me.

Actually, all that I meant to say was that the pragmatism of Dewey and the existentialism of Sartre are purely secular, naturalistic points of view. I confess I have not consulted the O.E.D., but my old Random House unabridged dictionary (1966 edition) defines "atheist" simply as "one who denies or disbelieves the existence of God or gods." Again, I should have thought that that definition would fit Dewey, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Camus, etc. But apparently the word atheist produces offense in some quarters. There is a view, prevalent in certain religious circles, that if a man is an atheist he must necessarily be a scoundrel—and *that* simply isn't true. One has only to read the biographies of David Hume and John Stuart Mill to find cases of men who were atheists in my sense (which is also, I would claim, the standard English sense) but most assuredly were not scoundrels. And of course Dewey and Sartre were not scoundrels, either. Curiously, there are passages in which Winetrout and Fisher seem to think that it's true that all atheists really *are* scoundrels, and therefore if a man clearly *isn't* a scoundrel, then he can't be an atheist, either. Thus they refer me to passages in which Dewey makes favorable comments on the Golden Rule, and one in which he said ". . . a truly moral act . . . is a reasonable act . . . ," and then ask what they obviously intend to be a rhetorical question, "Would statements such as the foregoing emanate from a man who is truly atheistic?"[3] I really don't know what to say except *why not*? I should add that the expression "militant atheist" is *not* redundant; I did not say that Dewey was a militant atheist.

Finally, there is one major point I tried to make in my earlier paper which I'm afraid Winetrout and Fisher missed completely, and that may have been my fault. Consider two examples. As a first example, the city in which I live is about five miles across. The university where I teach is on one side of town and the hospital where my wife works is on the other side. We have only one car. Thus I take her to work, return home, get ready, go to school, pick her up in the afternoon, etc. This means I drive a minimum of twenty miles per

day. How long can I do this, with the price of gasoline going steadily up, and maybe even running out? I would call this a *problem*, and I look for (*hope* for) help through science, in the form of increased production of gasoline, alternate energy forms, better fuel-saving automobiles, etc.

Consider a second example. I once heard about an English-speaking man who was present in one of the Japanese cities, Hiroshima or Nagasaki, as a missionary (I think), when that city was hit by an atomic bomb at the end of World War II. He wasn't killed (obviously) by the blast; he stepped out of what was left of his house in all the desolation around him. He said that what he remembered most was a maddened red horse that ran past him. It was only later that he thought—*red*? Horses aren't *red*. And then he realized that what had happened was that the searing heat of the bomb had actually burned all the hair *and* the flesh off the poor animal. I confess I cannot imagine that scene, but it is even *more* difficult, if that's possible, for me to imagine someone, perhaps a Martian visitor, coming upon that scene and saying, "Well now, there *does* seem to be a *problem* here." This is what I was trying, and failing, to get at when I said that there is a sense in which Dewey did not believe in the existence of evil. This is what I meant when I said that "The things that troubled Camus could hardly be termed social problems awaiting the successful application of the scientific method."[4] My worries about the price and availability of gasoline are a problem; the bomb (or the plague, or the war) is an *evil*.

I close with two comments. First, Winetrout and Fisher deserve credit for reminding us that what I said of Dewey's American Pragmatism could not have been said of William James (read his essays, "The Will to Believe" and "The Dilemma of Determinism," which are more in the spirit of existentialism). But I continue to believe that the John Dewey who wrote so glowingly of the scientific method could never have written lines such as those which Camus used to describe the mood of Dr. Rieux when the "plague" was finally over:

> He knew that those jubilant crowds did not know but could have learned from books: that the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and linen-chests; that it bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and the enlightening of men, it would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.[5]

Notes

[1]Elmer H. Duncan, *Journal of Thought*, Vol. 14, #1, January, 1979, pp. 22–29.

[2]Kenneth Winetrout and William H. Fisher, "On Pragmatism and Existentialism: a Response to Prof. Duncan," *Journal of Thought*, Vol. 15, #1, Spring, 1980, pp. 7–9.

[3]Winetrout and Fisher, p. 8.

[4]Duncan, p. 26.

[5]Albert Camus, *The Plague*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (Albert A. Knopf: New York, 1961), p. 278.

Authors & Articles

Major and Specific Current Problems in Higher Education

William H. Howick
College of Education
Memphis State University
Memphis, Tennessee 38152

At the very outset it is necessary to draw attention to the limitations placed on this presentation. The concern here is with real problems but only those encountered by higher education. Furthermore, the difficulties had to be contemporary ones to be included. And since higher education currently has an abundance of problems, it was well in this paper to restrict ourselves to those that are both major and specific, the former to control the length, and the latter to promote worthwhile discussion later.

That higher education on this continent is beset with problems can hardly be denied and that it is reaching a state of crisis is commonly accepted. Dr. John Sawhill, president of New York University, recently made the following statement:

> American education is in a state of crisis. It seems likely that the next decade will challenge the very survival of our university system. Rising costs, falling enrollments, an uncertain job market, increasingly specialized disciplines and a host of other variables will inevitably change our educational institutions.[1]

A similar appraisal recently was made of higher education for one area of the country. Dr. Roy S. Nicks, Chancellor of the State University and Community College System of the State of Tennessee, speaking of the challenges of the 1980's said:

> Our problems are legion and include a dwindling number of high school graduates, double-digit inflation that is as devastating to a university as to a family budget, financial support outpaced by ever-increasing expenses, energy concerns, government regulation and demanding shifts in job market and student needs.[2]

Presenting the various problems in pairs as opposites, that is, as conflicting terms, has been done in order to sharpen the contrast. The problems dealt with here are presented in a sequence that demonstrates how one dilemma leads to another.

A. *Intellectualism versus vocationalism* constitutes the first issue. Various titles have been used to designate those educators who hold to intellectuality as the supreme goal of the learning process. Such thinkers have been referred to as Aristotelian, Perennialists, and as Classical Realists. These theorists protest the present pattern of American society and its institutions because the present structure promotes technology and vocationalism to the gradual extinction of classical and intellectual pursuits.

We are reminded that the two great Greek thinkers, Plato and Aristotle, held that universals, i.e., abstract forms, constituted reality. These philosophers and their followers held that real education results from the contemplation of these universal ideas. The theory of universals in turn gave rise to the Latin "universitas" or university where such learning takes place. Later, the Christian Church with the aid of the great synthesis, *Summa Theologica*, by Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) verified the existence of universals as necessary for faith. Although challenges to the theory of universals came from such nominalists as Roscellinus (1050–1122) and to some extent from Peter Abelard (1079–1142), the metaphysical position expressed by Aristotle became entrenched in both philosophy and theology and has remained for centuries.

The nominalists saw universals as having no real existence, that is, they existed in name only. Within a few centuries thereafter, a rebirth of science appeared with the contributions of Galileo, Kepler, and especially Copernicus. The Western World began to move toward scientism, technology, industrialization, pragmatism, and some would add, secularization and materialism. These trends opened the doors to vocationalism in education so that institutions of learning, both secondary and higher, became job-oriented with a consequent decrease in their appeal to the intellectual potential of their students. The trend toward vocationalism in school programs and curricula was furthered by the demand for egalitarianism, including equality of educational opportunity and the satisfaction of personal needs. Increasingly larger numbers of enrollees in institutions of higher learning came to the campuses ill-prepared to study philosophical and

intellectual concepts. Education became a matter of training the hands, not the head. Both departments and courses dealing with classical concepts have had difficulty in surviving while those in business, physical education, audio visual aids, and other "how to" areas have blossomed forth. For a concrete example, one needs to look at the popularity of methods of teaching versus foundation courses.

Vocationalists defend their position by saying that they are being democratic, are meeting real needs of the students, and that not everyone wants or needs an intellectual education. Thus, education for job procurement and financial independence have now become the prime reasons for going to both high school and college.[3] The goal of intellectuality in education has been smothered by the pressures of the modern age. Job procurement was never the goal of our first universities and is not held to be one by modern classicists.

In reality, the survival of our institutions of learning and the society itself is in peril since our present course emphasizes neither intellectuality or morality and is leading us into bankruptcy intellectually and spiritually. Arguments holding classical realism to be unrealistic for this age and undemocratic do not carry much weight in view of the alternative. The question that remains is, "Can we regress, at least in practice, to that period of Western history when men admired the education of the mind and heart more than that of the hands? Do we really want to go back?" The very question is philosophical and illustrates the point that often the most practical move one can make is to become theoretical.

B. *Egalitarianism versus quality* is another major problem in higher education today. Let us note first the forces underlying egalitarianism which contribute to the erosion of academic standards. Then we will examine the administrative, instructional, and student accommodations to the trend toward equality.[4]

One major cause of lower academic standards has been the economic effect of lower student enrollment in institutions of higher education.There are fewer people of college age in the American community due to the declining birth rate of recent years. In addition, many of those of college age are now found in technical institutes instead of in university classes. Further, the youth of today are directly into work-training programs and to bypass the formal instruc-

tion offered by the colleges. And fewer students means reduced income for both public and private institutions.

The military draft, at least until recently, siphoned off many youth of college age, while affirmative action programs sometimes provided students who demanded that colleges accommodate them so as to meet their needs, all in keeping with the egalitarian climate of thought prevailing throughout this country. Decreased college enrollment contributed to the tight job market for instructors in higher education, and in turn, to greater competition among professors for academic honors.

Administrative reactions to decreased enrollment were several. Efforts were made to attract students who otherwise may never have seriously considered attendance at a college. Financial agreements were made with them with the aid of public funds so as to assist so-called worthy students. Often these prospects did not have the academic background for entrance into higher education or the personal commitment necessary for success in college. They expected special consideration and usually got it. In addition, some administrators looked with disfavor on any professor whose courses made requirements or maintained standards that resulted in lower grades for students, failure to pass, or withdrawal of too many enrollees. In some instances the most popular professor with some administrators was the one who brought in new students using innovative, even if suspect, methods and kept his classes full semester after semester.

Efforts were made also to stem the rate of student drop out. Classes were to be more relaxed, professors were to entertain and keep the customers satisfied. One unhappy student sometimes equaled several unhappy administrators. Various teaching approaches were used, if not mandated, to assure that all students would eventually pass and graduate.

Professors reacted by teaching less and discussing more. Prepared lectures were often replaced by "much ado about nothing." Higher grades were awarded to the less-deserving and "grade inflation" became a well-known term. Besides, the more generous the grading, the more popular the professor, the fewer the grade appeals, the more students per class and the more the classes would "make," especially those scheduled for competitive summer school semesters. Finally, the professor himself knew that generous grading and reports from happy students made it a greater likelihood that he would receive the desired promotion and that most coveted award, tenure.

Students responded accordingly. They capitalized on the professors' casual friendliness, expecting that anything they said in class would be accepted as correct and that any work or activity they happened to accomplish was to be credited toward higher grades. Professors have been known to give credit for one term paper in two different courses. Classes often became sessions in which the discussion was a "mutual exchange of common ignorance." Colleges became both "easy in" and "easy out" with diplomas and degrees so weak that on occasion, if the holder was not outright contemptuous of his award, he was at least embarrassed in the presence of the properly educated.

The lowering of standards and quality of learning was not just a means to serve the slow learner, to help the disadvantaged, or to assist the poorly prepared. It was primarily a reaction to job insecurity and loss of potential financial support. Some way the empire of learning had to be maintained. In effect, the degrading of standards and the diluting of degrees has led many people into thinking they were educated when they were only schooled. To put it bluntly, some institutions of learning have actually deceived people in order to preserve themselves. The effects are already evident throughout the country, as seen in the obvious lack of intelligent leadership in almost every kind of institution in the society from the government, the church, to the classrooms of America.

C. *The economy of the country and the economy of the college* may be the most basic problem of them all.[5] During the earliest days of American educational history, back when Joseph Lancaster operated his monitorial system, the cost per school year per child for basic education was approximately two dollars. Now that cost has reached nearly fifteen hundred dollars and the tax payers are in revolt. We are all aware of Proposition Thirteen and its effects across the country. Not only are the lower schools suffering from the shortage of funds, but higher education is in dire need as well. The state university is not now the "fair-haired boy" or the "darling of the legislature" in any state in the nation.

Legislators and their supporters, the tax payers, are no longer convinced that investments in higher education pay the highest dividends. Perhaps the activism of the 1960's contributed to this change of heart, but generally it seems to be bad politics to allocate funds to the universities when the people are demanding technical training for

the masses and revolting against increased taxation for institutions that appear to have little relevance to their own needs for jobs and so-called practical skills.

In higher education many programs have felt the ax. Money for faculty travel has been severely restricted, especially if the trip is out-of-state. In some areas, travel money is available only if the professor is on the program or an officer of the association. The increases in salaries of earlier years to help instructors keep pace with inflation are no more, and generally, professors are losing buying power annually.

Budgets have been tightened, supplies limited, and programs trimmed to effect savings in real dollars. Class size requirements have been increased, especially for summer school classes, resulting in fewer summer teaching opportunities for professors and another decrease in annual income. To further complicate the economic problem, institutions of learning have been forced rather abruptly to delegate larger and larger percentages of their income to pay for needed energy.

Just at a time when universities and colleges would like to reduce students' tuition and fees to attract more learners and encourage enrollment, they are forced by the economic situation to raise the costs to the students. Meanwhile, the customers have learned they can obtain more immediate and greater financial rewards with less effort by turning to on-the-job training for a trade.

There is a close relationship between the level of economic prosperity or depression of a country and the level of support available to its institutions of learning. American educational economists have long held that the public educational establishment in this country needs a total budget equal to approximately eight percent of the gross national product. Depending on how one computes the revenue for education and determines what should be included, public education may be receiving about seven percent at present with little prospect of more, and meanwhile, the value of that amount is lessening daily as a result of the fires of inflation.

D. *Government control and university autonomy* is the last problem for discussion in this paper. The economic problem just treated here has forced the universities to look beyond their own campuses for financial aid. Besides, it has become prestigious for an institution to be involved with the federal government and credited with making a

contribution to the nation's good. Research bureaus have appeared, geared to obtaining more of government largess. "Grantsmen" have been trained and expertise developed in order to get the most from the capitol's coffers.

Educational historians remind us that there is a precedent for our current problems with government control which goes all the way back to the days of the ancient Greek philosophical schools. The best known of these institutions were the Academy of Plato from 387 B.C., the Lyceum of Aristotle from 335 B.C., the Garden of Epicurus, 300 B.C. and the Stoa, 301–300 B.C.[6] For a time these institutions and others like them operated outside the walls of the City of Athens. Historians have recorded that security of both teachers and students became a problem. It was sometimes unsafe to journey outside the walls of Athens to attend the sessions at these philosophical schools, especially since the discourses were commonly held outside in groves. So, the little philosophical schools, one by one, moved inside the protective walls of the city. Once inside, they had to have places to meet, often just porches. And not only did they need some kind of structure to gather under, but the need for some financial support arose as well. The Greeks did not like to mix intellectual and philosophical concerns with money matters and so did not choose to assess student and parents. Instead, these early leaders of education turned to the government for economic aid. Under the well-known argument that they were educating the future leaders of the country, they were able to obtain governmental support.

To state the point plainly and in modern terms, the schoolmen applied for federal aid and received both federal aid and federal control. It has ever been so and will continue as long as politics and human nature remain as they are. In Athens, it was not long before the authorities determined who would teach, who would be admitted as students, and even what would be taught. When the government controls the faculty, the administration, the student body, and the curricula, then the government controls the entire program.

Modern higher education on this continent is no better, if not worse in some respects, than that of the philosophical schools of ancient Athens. There are some universities in the country which would collapse if public funds from Washington, D.C. were suspended. And most others operate under federal guidelines for fear of losing financial support. The government "leans on" them to force certain hiring practices which results frequently in contracting with inferior

people to serve on the faculties. Students are also admitted according to government regulations and the learning program is modified to make sure that certain students do not fail. At least, these are the charges heard across the land.

Federal funds have brought federal control including a multiplicity of court cases for alleged failure to comply with the liberal construction of the United States Constitution or with new social legislation. If the government does not haul the university into court, the students will, and now even the faculties and staffs are doing the same.[7]

In most institutions the bureaucracy, both with regard to the number of people and the amount of paper work, has approximately tripled in the past fifteen years. One wonders if it might not be less expensive for the institutions to ignore federal handouts, and by so doing, reduce their costs and thus, regain control of their own programs.

The problems treated here are interrelated. There is no solution possible by resolving any one by itself, since no one problem can be isolated. Alleviation can be achieved only by looking for a package of related mitigations that might offer hope over a long period of time. It can be readily seen that each problem in higher education affects every other one.

Let it be noted, in conclusion, that if the survival of higher education is possible, mere survival is not sufficient. The educational leaders of this great country, we hope, will settle for nothing less than a major role and a dynamic future for the institutions of learning in American society.[8]

Notes

[1]Sawhill, Dr. John C., "A Question of Ethics." *Newsweek*, 29 October 1979, p. 27.

[2]Nicks, Dr. Roy S., "Challenge of the '80s." *The Columns*, Memphis State University Press, Memphis, Tennessee, Volume XIII, Number 3, April 1980, p. 2.

[3]Pulliam, John, "Higher Education and the Decline of the Job Market." *Journal of Thought*, Volume VII, Number 4, November, 1972, pp. 267–273.

[4]Williams, Lloyd P., "The High Cost of Egalitarianism in American Education." *Journal of Thought*, Volume VII, Number 4, November, 1972, pp. 250–253.

[5]Smith, David C., "Retrospect and Prospect in Higher Education." *Journal of Thought*, Volume XI, Number 4, November, 1976, pp. 268–270.

[6]Butts, R. Freeman, *The Education of the West*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973, pp. 99–100.

[7]"The Campus and the Courts." *Vanderbilt Alumnus*, Volume 65, Number 3, Spring, 1980, pp. 3–13.

[8]Raywid, Mary Anne, "The Hard Challenges to Higher Education." *Journal of Thought*, Volume VII, Number 4, November, 1972, pp. 241–246.

Tentative Solutions to the Problems of Higher Education Today

Donald S. Seckinger
College of Education
University of Wyoming
Laramie, Wyoming 82071

We in Foundations of Education take pride in placing the problems of education in historical perspective. Accordingly, I would like to quote from George Santayana's *Character and Opinion in the United States* (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956)—originally published in 1920, describing Harvard in the last decades of the nineteenth century:

> The teaching required was for the most part college teaching, in college subjects, such as might well have been entrusted to tutors; but it was given by professors in the form of lectures, excessive in number and too often repeated; and they were listened to by absent-minded youths, ill-grounded in the humanities, and not keenly alive to intellectual interests. (p. 37)

It is interesting to observe that the Harvard Santayana was describing had entered what was considered a golden age in American philosophy and education. President Eliot had brought about significant reforms that would be copied by the emerging American public high school; Eliot and U.S. Commissioner of Education William Torrey Harris were in the process of defining the American ideology of liberal education as the century closed, through their work as chairpersons of the N.E.A. Committee of Ten and Committee of Fifteen respectively; and on the Harvard faculty were not only Santayana but William James and Josiah Royce.

One wonders what Santayana's opinion would have been as the disease of vocationalism—the first and in my opinion most important of Professor Howick's selected problems—continued to spread. Probably he would have agreed with these words of Robert Hutchins in *The Higher Learning in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936)—describing the situation in American universities between the world wars:

> We try to adjust students to life by giving them information about it, though we know the information will be archaic when they graduate. We try to adjust students to their life work by telling them how a professional man operates; we seldom bother to tell them why. (p. 53)

The above citations serve only to reinforce the main arguments advanced by Professor Howick. Certainly vocationalism or anti-intellectualism have spread to every outpost of liberal learning, to every department of arts and sciences and humanities. Most assuredly social pressures for producing manufactured products of practical use in our higher education programs are joined by a misplaced egalitarianism that views all ideas as equally acceptable and therefore as equally worthless and all persons, ultimately, as identical interchangeable parts. Economic and governmental pressures, as Howick has pointed out, interact in such a way as to intensify the first two selected problems.

It is of course one thing to endorse Professor Howick's selected problems of higher education and even to show that they have been developing in our colleges and universities for the better part of a century. It is quite another to offer even tentative solutions. I would prefer to regard the following suggestions as alleviating possibilities for problems that run so deeply through American culture that they have no solutions.

Vocationalism seems inherent in a system of higher education that raises its funding and sells itself to the general public with promises of good jobs and rewarding careers for youth. This is not only optimistic overselling, it is losing track of what a liberal arts and sciences and humanities undergraduate education really means. Excellent employment opportunities may well follow in the wake of an excellent education, or they may not, but it is not the universities' place to try and sell the public the idea that all of its learning activities will have an immediate direct payoff in the economic marketplace.

This is not to hold with the opposite side of the coin, that is, a misplaced intellectual snobbery on the part of academic departments that their work is somehow superior to the professional education and training of the applied fields such as teaching, administration, engineering, business, law, and so on. It is not a defense of intellectualism as an ideology, but rather of the uses of intellect in a liberal and professional education.

Some very important steps in reversing or arresting the spread of

vocationalism in teacher education have been undertaken by the American Educational Studies Association. Publication of the *Standards for Academic and Professional Instruction* (Ames, Iowa: Educational Studies, 1977) has been most helpful; training of Foundations faculty to participate in NCATE evaluation teams has been more helpful still. In my own university, recommendations of Foundations members of an NCATE team resulted in our Dean of Education's issuing a directive that Master's Degree candidates in all departments of teacher education take at least one course in the humanistic and one course in the behavioral studies of education.

Of course, progress from our standpoint as Foundations faculty members is never uniform. In the year or two subsequent to our Dean's decision our College of Education has interpreted a course in "human relations" as meeting the "humanities" standard of NCATE and, to further add to the ambiguous outcome, a course in History and Philosophy of Physical Education has been added to the curriculum and accepted by the university as partially meeting the General Education requirement in Humanities. Thus my statement on the alleviation rather than the solution of problems.

Another example of hopefulness again comes from accreditation agencies such as NCATE. Specifically the NCATE standard on Multicultural Education has enabled us to add a new undergraduate Foundations course to our teacher education curriculum. Vocationally oriented departments have not yet tried to appropriate the content of this new offering, but if it attracts the enrollments we anticipate, we can then expect a move on the part of some other entities in the College of Education to propose their own versions designed especially for their own majors. Finally, I should add another note of caution in the light of this momentary success. One reason in favor of the new offering was that it would not require any additional staff, money, materials, or budget. When this situation will change, and what will be the effect on our program, it is difficult to predict.

Closely related to vocationalism is egalitarianism. And again in the accreditation standards of professional organizations we find promise and confusion mingled. The NCATE standard on behavioral and humanistic studies states that it does not wish to impose any particular curricular or course pattern on member institutions. The vagueness of the standard appears to be politically expedient, in light of the many ways in which colleges, schools, and departments of teacher educa-

tion are organized. It also seems to endorse a kind of egalitarianism of subject areas, so that if one teaches in a humanistic manner, for example, then one has fulfilled the humanities of education requirement for prospective teachers.

Professor Howick rightly points out the anticipated decline in student enrollments as a contributing factor in the problem of egalitarianism. It is a situation made even more confusing by contradictory statements in the media. We are told, on the one hand, that enrollments in public education are in the process of going down year by year, since their peak in the mid 1970s. We have the experience of thousands of college and university faculty, both those connected with large public institutions and those affiliated with smaller private liberal arts colleges, being out of work. Indeed, the Philosophy of Education Society has maintained a special committee for jobs for the unemployed for the past few years.

On the other hand, the American Council on Education, in a report published last Summer, indicates a sharp increase in older students and in graduate student enrollment picking up the slack as undergraduate numbers fall off. Then too we have distinctive local conditions. My university has been experiencing a moderate but steady growth throughout the 1970s, following a growth spurt in the 1960s. Two of the reasons given would seem to relate to our problems topic: still modest tuition charges and open academic admissions standards. Whenever I meet my undergraduate Foundations of Education sections, a course, incidentally, that has no prerequisites, I am reminded of Santayana's Harvard youths of the turn of the century.

As far as our misplaced egalitarianism is concerned, one of the tentative alleviations may reside in the elementary and secondary system that sends its graduates to us. Vermont Royster writes in *The Wall Street Journal* of May 28, 1980:

> It's startling now to look back on what grammar school students were once expected to read. . . .
>
> There, for the edification of schoolchildren, are excerpts from Shakespeare, Dryden, Samuel Johnson, Ruskin, Byron, Milton, Dickens, Disraeli, Jefferson, Daniel Webster, the elder Pitt, Joseph Addison and even Sir Humphrey Davy and William Blackstone. McGuffey's other Readers are equally rich.

He then goes on to note observations similar to those of Santayana and Hutchins. No doubt much of what was once a commonly shared

literary culture in secondary and higher education, the kind of liberal education Eliot and Harris sought to make secure at the end of the last century, is no longer shared by the larger and less selected population now attending high school and college.

I would second Professor Howick's observations also in regard to the misuse of student evaluations. Inevitably the rewards to faculty in the form of public recognition, faster promotion, and higher raises in salary, seem to go to those who are teaching in a "marketable" field and who receive high popularity ratings from large numbers of undergraduates. I myself have somewhat mixed feelings when I see my own students praising me for personality characteristics such as warmth and helpfulness, but failing to mention anything about course content, which still seems to them as something to be gotten through.

The problem of the economy, of course, touches upon every public institution. More and more the public through its representatives in state legislatures, or smaller publics through private boards of trustees, seems to demand proof of actual cash value for the investment in higher education. The kind of economic pressures we are feeling now appear to go in cycles. A few years ago, for example, I was curious as to why the university had adopted the statement on academic freedom issued in 1940 by the American Association of University Professors. Looking into the situation, it seems that certain state legislators were critical of the supposed short hours of the faculty in comparison to the long hours on a working ranch. The dispute was somehow settled by the founding of an A.A.U.P. unit on campus and the adoption, in 1940, of the statement of that year.

Solutions or even alleviations for the economic problem seem to be the least promising of all. It almost reduces itself to a question of the economic survival of individual faculty members by means of tax-sheltered annuities for those of us in public institutions. Unionization may be another trend that will help the professor who finds his purchasing power dwindling and his or her travel and research funds cut while classes are enlarged. It is curious that small classes can be so desirable from an instructional point of view, especially in philosophy and the humanities in general, and yet viewed as intolerably uneconomical from an administrative standpoint.

Even if we argue for strong union and government intervention in the workings of the present economic marketplace, the question can be raised, aren't we now looking, in the 1980s and beyond, at an

overextended, energy-short, less productive economic system? Until the reindustrialization of America and the development of alternate energy sources, aren't government and union actions trying to get more slices out of a smaller pie? Adding to my sober evaluation of this area is the fact that my university is in a right to work state with a strong conservative majority in the legislature. In fairness it should be said that state support for our physical facilities continues to be excellent; even as I write this earth movers are at work restructuring much of the campus, certainly my corner of the campus. The appropriation and distribution of faculty salary increases is something else again.

This in turn leads us into the related problem area of government control. Our region of the country is no exception to the national trend of seeking and becoming ever more dependent upon the wishes of higher levels of government. I must confess to being infected with this virus myself. Among other projects I am participating in is a proposed workshop for Social Studies teachers, to be funded by a governmental agency. With government support, of course, goes government control. Alleviation for this problem is very difficult to see, since it is so closely related to the economic hard times that now seem to be upon us. To ask us to forego seeking government aid in such times may be a challenge we are not prepared to accept.

One solution to the political problem would be for a university to withdraw from all programs of federal aid to the institution as such, leaving aid to individual students intact. A recent court ruling on behalf of a private eastern college that prides itself on not accepting institutional aid appears to support the idea that federal control is not inevitable. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine a multipurpose state university going in this direction. From the very beginning of the land grant college movement, from the time of the Morrill Act of 1862, state and university authorities have been required to render an account of their expenditures to the federal government. Other institutions, by applying for federal aid in the practical and applied arts and sciences, what used to be called "Agriculture and the Mechanic Arts," have long since placed themselves under the scrutiny of bureaucracy.

A more promising alleviation of both the economic and political problems may reside in the area of public opinion. The Arts and Sciences College in The University of Wyoming, for example, has

been engaged in an intensive public relations program for the last few years, with special emphasis on the sciences and engineering disciplines contributing directly to Wyoming's energy development and economic prosperity. With these subject matters as the cutting edge, the other disciplines in Arts and Sciences have found supporters among alumni holding influential positions in government and business throughout the state.

And so I would like to close my presentation on a note of hope, tinged not a little with ambiguity. Again I resort to a publication that just came in the university mail, *A & S Reports*, Fall, 1980, published by the College of Arts and Sciences, The University of Wyoming. On page 5 is a quotation by Robert Gordon, who received a humanities Bachelor of Arts Degree a few years ago and is now employed as an Employee Relations Representative, Champlin Petroleum Company, Rock Springs, Wyoming. After mentioning the typical skills and knowledges required by business and industry when hiring university graduates, he goes on to cite additional qualities for those who would excel:

> Foremost among these extra qualities are those of superior communications and interpersonal skills. No curriculum, save that of the liberal arts, involves the diversity capable of developing all of these traits. Consequently, the liberal arts graduate offers industry the talent for a wide array of management, professional, and staff positions.

I think you can see why I have mixed feelings about this kind of argument on behalf of humanities in the university. This seems to be one of the most promising directions to take from a practical survival point of view. Whether this can be done without sacrificing academic freedom and the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, remains to be seen.

Anthropology of Education: Methods and Applications

Alanson A. Van Fleet, Editor
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
A Special Topic Edition Of The
Journal of Thought, Vol. 15, No. 3, Fall 1980

By depicting the advantages and limitations of ethnographic research in education and educational evaluation, and by presenting illustrative cases in which anthropological perspectives and methods are used, this volume offers professionals and students an insight into the overlapping areas of anthropology and education. Articles include the following:

—Murray and Rosalie Wax (Washington University), "Anthropological Fieldwork: Comments on Its Values and Limitations."
—George Overholt (Georgia State University), "Ethnography and Education: Limitations and Sources of Error."
—Teresa Scott Kincheloe (Sinte Gleska College), "Margaret Mead's Early Fieldwork: Methods and Implications for Education."
—David Fetterman (RMC Research Corporation), "Ethnographic Techniques in Educational Evaluation: An Illustration."
—W. T. Morrill & D. M. Steffy (Pennsylvania State University), "The Ethnography of Collegiate Teaching: Bridging the Student and Academic Cultures."
—Michael Logan & Alanson Van Fleet (University of Tennessee), "Student and Faculty Culture in Higher Education: A Research Note."
—Elizabeth Eddy (University of Florida) & Joan True (George Washington University), "Establishing the Unitary Classroom: Organizational Change and School Culture."
—Margaret D. LeCompte (Houston Independent School District), "The Civilizing of Children: How Young Children Learn to Become Students."
—James Lynn Buschman (Michigan State University), "Adult Schooling and Access to Society: A Brazilian Community Study."

$6.00 each

AVAILABLE FROM THE:
Journal of Thought
Collings Hall—204
820 Van Vleet Oval
University of Oklahoma
Norman, OK 73019

Postage and handling: $1.00 for the first copy and 50¢ for each additional copy. Instructor's copy provided with orders of 10 or more.

Conjectural Notes on the Future of Higher Education

Lloyd P. Williams
College of Education
University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma 73019

Trust no Future, howe'er pleasant!
. . . Act—act in the Present!

That our English cousins should have erected a bust of Longfellow in Westminster Abbey, the first American to be so honored, should alert us to his importance. Notwithstanding the literacy technicians' tendency to denigrate him today, the above quotation, and many similar ones, contain that wisdom and insight achieved principally by poets. Sometimes philosophers see the same things, but they are often strangled by their own tortuous rhetoric.

Provident men should, of course, reflect upon the future, consider its possibilities, anticipate its dangers, seek solutions to its emerging problems, as well as adjust both their institutions and their views to its demands if not its vagaries. To do otherwise is foolish. Equally foolish, however, is the thought that we can divine the future, and that is why Longfellow is right: we should live in the present, cherish its beauty, honor its opportunities, and act when its possiblities permit us to add to the goodness and beauty of the world. In so doing, we should also be ever mindful of the impenetrability of the future in addition to being undeceived by the lure of our speculations, however convincing they may seem to us.

Having cautioned against our presumptions and postulated the prudence of living in the present, the temptation to dogmatize to a learned group of colleagues about the future is too alluring to resist even though I know absolutely nothing about it. Further, it is a pleasure to speculate on such a large subject when neither time nor your inclinations a few years hence will likely suggest you call me to account for misjudgments or gross errors.

I have no privileged perspective, but perhaps we can effectively conjecture about the future if we rely upon the tendencies of the past as a basis—particularly those tendencies since the middle ages and the renaissance.

Using such a foundation, there appear to be five tendencies affecting higher education and Western culture evident for many years that will *probably* continue. These probable tendencies are:

(1) continued decline of interest in the classical languages—Latin, Greek, and Hebrew—and a parallel, continuing decline in attention to the literature originally written in these languages;

(2) continued decline of interest in religious education as well as a decline in the number of church-related colleges and universities and the number of students in them in relation to state institutions;

(3) continued growth of interest in science and scientific education, although the focus is likely to be more and more upon applied technology rather than pure science;

(4) continued decline of interest in the study of mathematics as a liberal discipline and a continued growth of attention to mathematics useful to business and industry;

(5) continued fragmentation of knowledge and a further proliferation of the confusion and uncertainty that goes with it both in and out of higher education; and

(6) continued and perhaps increasing use of higher education as an economic safety valve which postpones the day when we must face the awesome contradictions and presumptions of the present social, economic system.

In addition to these probable ones, there are also some *possible* tendencies. The principal ones seem to be the following:

(1) Further adulteration of standards—especially as we continue the "open" university program—seems almost inevitable.

(2) Continuing erosion of the humanities also seems likely as degree programs are more and more oriented toward job and vocational competence.

(3) Substitution of egalitarianism in education for democracy will further cheapen the curriculum by diminishing or eliminating its substantive subjects. For example:

(a) modern languages will more and more be minimized, even in liberal arts degrees;

(b) literature will play a less conspicuous role in liberal education;

(c) pseudo-scientific pretentions will more and more encroach upon such academic fields as government, psychology, sociology, and professional education;

(d) trivialized degree programs will expand, e.g., "human relations," "self study degrees," and "off campus degrees;"
(e) banalization of classes will continue and expand as ill-formed discussions—rapping and group dynamics—supersede the informed, systematic presentation of organized knowledge;
(f) debasing the curriculum with "new subjects" varying from the trivial to the pathetic; and
(g) producing doctorates like beer cans on an assembly line, many of whom enjoy high competence in a narrow specialization, but who are often all but devoid of humanistic sensibility.

(4) Continued substitution of linguistic analysis for philosophic reflection will weaken the great potential which academic instruction in philosophy possesses.

(5) This decline in the historic cultivation of philosophic sensibility will further diminish our sense of purpose, minimize our chances of building an integrated conception of life and education, and compound our insecurity and bewilderment.

(6) The mania for "research"—an activity ill-defined and institutionally required—will be further extended throughout the collegiate-university community.

(7) No serious effort will be made to differentiate substantive research from trivia, as we shall continue to worship at the shrine of quantity.

(8) The continued corruption of staff and students and the erosion of traditional standards are likely as grade inflation continues, as pursuit of money dominates administrative-academic planning, as government grants continue to seduce the faculty, as administrators seek more and more bodies, and as the undisciplined compulsion for self-assertion continues to pervade society and higher education.

(9) Group negotiations, unionization, or other corporate approaches to the determination of salaries, status, and other questions historically reserved for the administration seems likely.

(10) An enlarging interest in computers, an expanded training of computer specialists, and a parallel reliance upon electronic gadgetry as a substitute for reflective interpersonal instruction, will likely continue.

(11) Finally, the madness of commercialized-amateur athletics will continue, and those schools able to finance it, or willing to take the low road, will join the bacchanal.

The world being what it is, there are a number of things that ought to characterize the future of higher education; however, in our blind quest for status, money, and power—all infused with endless efforts at self-gratification, their implementation enjoys *a very low probability*. Nevertheless, the following reforms would greatly enrich the quality and consequences of American higher education.

(1) The need for realism is great—to see ourselves, our profession, and our society as they are in fact, so we can overcome our childish sentimentalism as well as our unwarranted optimism. Humanitarianism tempered with realism is a fine quality; sentimentalism and optimism are the characteristics of an ingenuous intellect. Both university teaching and administration from time to time need rectification on these points.

(2) The absence of a clear sense of purpose in the modern university is a scandal. Without an integrated philosophic sense, fundamental redirection is all but impossible. We seem baffled by the problem: are universities recreation centers; or are they agencies for taking up slack in the job market; or are they social centers where self-indulgent children corrupt the Hellenic ideal; or is the university a center for generating knowledge, refining knowledge, disseminating knowledge, and teaching professional skills? Observation suggests some of each, which gives us an assemblage of indecision and perplexity.

(3) Commercialism, aimlessness, and recreational emphasis all militate against the intellectualization of the university. Santayana once, when commenting on American civilization, suggested a sizeable portion of those in universities devote a surprisingly small part of their energy to the intellectual. This describes all too many universities and Colleges of Education. A university not dedicated to the intellectual life is a contradiction in terms.

(4) There is great need for emancipation from the market mentality, both in and out of universities, for Western capitalist society is shot through with love of money and passion for the acquisition of goods. In such an atmosphere the serious purposes of a university are often deflected or distorted. The promotion of emotional maturity is a precondition to a solution of this problem.

(5) Universities need administration for adminstration sake. And they need fewer administrators. Universities are not government bureaus, nor should they be thought of as efficiency-oriented businesses, and the failure clearly to conceive their function is strangling them with paper work, busy work, committee meetings, and endless

banalizing irrelevance. If we are wise, our energies will be directed, among other things, toward the simplification of life, including the simplification of life within universities.

(6) If professional schools are to be truly professional, and not simply trade schools, then they must be predicated upon a solid humanistic base. Proliferation of knowledge makes this difficult, but the imperative is still there, for what we are often doing is graduating high level technicians but not necessarily educated men. The consequences for the quality of life and the future of self-governing institutions is potentially lethal, yet hopefully reversible.

(7) A national "Educational Bill of Rights" for students would do much to encourage talent, stabilize higher education, and permit universities to avoid the "money and body game" while zeroing in on the historic mission they should perform. Only two requirements for the student need underpin such a bill: citizenship and respectable academic performance.

(8) The mindless drive toward ever-enlargement of universities is a reflection of America's love affair with quantity. Precisely what the maximum size should be is not clear, but institutions over fifteen or twenty thousand rapidly become ungovernable as they are overrun with congestion, digression, needless conflict, and horrendous quantities of paper work.

(9) One other recommendation seems to entail urgency; namely, the scandal in commercialized athletics conducted in the name of physical education. Physical education in the sense of achieving good health, mastering recreational skills, and understanding this complicated piece of machinery we call a body is a discipline of first-rate importance. Effective physical education puts its emphasis upon ways and means of building the wholesome body, understanding its functions, play, and good mental health through sensible competition. In the present milieu, when coaches and athletic directors talk of character in relationship to athletics, they play the same role as CIA agents extolling peace and national honor. The solution is a relatively simple one: detach competitive athletics in higher education from the academic program of both high schools and colleges leaving all the other processes intact. Those athletes who wish to study may do so; those choosing not to do so are free to follow their own inclinations as they enjoy four years of eligibility. One parthian shot on this point. The "Colorado affair" is a classic illustration of fraud in the adminis-

tration of college-university athletics. Herein a man is presented to the young as an example of inspiration and character. Then he violates his contract with one state university, goes to the "big-time," and then violates another contract as well. Other indiscretions are evident to the thoughtful observer. What of the overseeing board, the NCAA? Not one word of criticism or censure came from them, and action was unthinkable. For the NCAA to oversee big money sports such as football is not unlike making the penitentiary inmates the guards. Universities are too important and the preservation of their integrity too critical for us to continue this charade.

The future is always a charming enigma, and it may or may not work out as we predict. That we should be ever-mindful of its dangers and possibilities is a characteristic of the informed mind. By the same logic we should restrain our optimism and bridle our expectations while cheerfully accepting our limitations. Bright and well-intentioned as they are, political and educational liberals, especially those who would reform us in spite of ourselves, are a combination of high hopes predicated upon a naive interpretation of the nature of man and society, and mixed with innocence. Understandably, therefore, they often fail to see that their resolution and confidence are sometimes a form of social or educational cyanide. Lest the true believer consider these remarks partisan, let me add quickly that the conservatives often fit the same mold and are in the same trap; they are merely going backwards into oblivion whereas the liberals are going forward into confusion. Much of the disorder in modern universities rests squarely on the shoulders of the self-serving reformer—and all too many professors fit that category.

Like the ideas of democracy, justice, constitutional government, the Bill of Rights, universal education, and the worth of the individual, the idea of a university is a treasured part of civilization. As such, we who are blessed with a career in universities should cherish our opportunities—and we will, provided we see them in historical and moral perspective—and labor diligently to preserve their finest qualities. If we are conscious of the best of that tradition—Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas, Kant, Hegel, Santayana, Whitehead, James, Dewey, and the rest of that illustrious roster too numerous to cite—we shall quietly tread the wine presses of higher education with undiminished resolve to make the universities of the future even greater than those of the past. To do less is to betray our heritage.

Can Higher Education Survive—A Critical Response

David B. Owen
University of Chicago
1154 Heather Lane
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Probably most of us tend to agree in general with the foregoing essays outlining our problems and prospects. In this response, therefore, I would like to explore a different perspective on the current situation and transform the discussion from one based on institutional action, whether formal or informal, to one based on individual action. In so doing, I hope to draw attention from what appear to be the indirect effects that one may have on the future of our collective vocation to those effects directly consequent upon one's own activity. By indirect effects I have in mind those produced by such activities as voting for political representatives at the local, state, and national levels who concur with our own educational purposes. Similarly, one's attempts to influence state departments of education, accrediting agencies, even the administration of one's own college or university, whether conducted through national organizations such as the AESA, through collective bargaining, or through more personal contacts, all generate indirect effects in the sense that the future actions that one's purposes envisage are modified more or less greatly by the purposes of others. Such circumstances may give rise to activities pursued jointly with others; such circumstances may give rise to fruitful dialogue, even to agreement about common actions, or they may produce debate, antagonism, even the frustration of one's purposes. In all these situations, however, what eventually is done (or not done) will tend to be only a distant echo of one's original thoughts. I would like, therefore, to explore what influence an individual can have on his profession, and ask a simple question: What can *I* do about the future of higher education?

The answer is not simple, but in the next few paragraphs I would like to explore one type of activity over which each of us does have direct control. What I have in mind is our individual capacity to

reflect upon the educational activities we are engaged in. To help specify such activity, consider two objects of that reflection that seem particularly relevant as we look to the future, namely, of our use of language and our conception of the character of knowledge.

In his recent book, *Less Than Words Can Say*, Richard Mitchell called attention to the Latin root of the word, "conscious," which translates as "knowing with" something. That something with which we are conscious, with which we know ourselves, other humans, and the world around us, is ideas, ideas expressed in words. We are currently leaving behind, hopefully, a period in which we often conceived of language as composed of fixed units of meaning or reference, as if words had been entities which we could measure, behaviorally if not physically. This conception probably lies behind much of the technical jargon that has proliferated throughout research journals on all subjects. The direction in which this tendency leads is a word for everything, that is, a vocabulary infinite in size, one which, consequently, is wholly useless for communication. Men such as Noam Chomsky have attempted to transform this conception of language, and historically a variety of other conceptions have proven fruitful in thinking about that with which we communicate. Nevertheless, the tendency to create whole new lexicons within each discipline, even within subdisciplines, has more than a hint of intellectual isolationism, of initiation into a tribal magic language. A fundamental paradox is involved in the technical tendency of the language in each of our specialties: if education is a form of communication, then such increasing restriction of audience for our thoughts, such diminution of communication, is contrary to the purposes each of us has as an educator.

Consider two consequences of the use of unnecessary technical jargon in our work. First, one may fail to communicate with those outside his specialty, thereby losing potential support—a *very* important consideration, today—as well as stimulation for work that, presumably, is interesting and important. Conversely, one may fail to gather the fruits of the labors of others outside his special vineyard. Second, that technical jargon is inherently conducive to questionable logic. The apparent rigor of the language may lull one into believing a significant idea is being presented when only the language, not the mind, is in motion. Conversely, one may fail to perceive that a student who has assimilated the specialized vocabulary is manipulating his teacher, not his ideas.

This transformation of language into technical entities has, not accidentally, its parallel—and now I come to my second issue—in the transformation of knowledge into information, into "facts" and "data." We tend to forget the Latin root of both: "facts" as "that which has been made" invites the question, *how*; "data" as "that which has been given" invites the question, *by whom*? My point is a simple one; Dewey in *Democracy and Education* insisted on the necessity of avoiding divorce between product and process. Yet we continue to speak of our specialties as "bodies of knowledge," of our disciplines as structures of fact, of our (scientific) methods as the accumulation of data. This is the point at which our use of language and our conception of the character of knowledge run a parallel course, for both reveal a common assumption about how we look at the world. In general, our professional language and disciplines look out upon a Newtonian universe of bodies in motion. We tend to view language as the identification of word with thing and to see knowledge as the accumulation of the former in its capacity to predict the motion of the latter. Knowledge becomes bits of information, and the greater the quantity of information, the greater the "knowledge." Thus, we speak of knowledge doubling every generation, every ten years, every seven years, and so on.

The second area where each of us individually can have a direct effect lies in reflection upon our professional activity. In the caricature just drawn, justice was done neither to Newton nor to those who have worked in the positivist or behaviorist traditions. That point is, however, that we need to reconsider, individually as well as collectively, the disciplinary traditions in which we are currently active. Perhaps it would be fruitful to explore anew the widest possible range of assumptions which might hypothetically guide our research, our teaching, and our discussions. One way to make such exploration systematic is to return to the great historical formulations of educational principles, processes, and purposes. Naturally, in such inquiry the particularities of circumstance and presentation must be recognized and accounted for. Nevertheless, within these formulations lies a diversity in ways of conceiving education that is independent of circumstance and presentation. Such enduring conceptions might be called autonomous ideas. A renewed consideration of the interplay and transformations in history of these autonomous ideas will reinvigorate each individual who inquires into them by revealing a much larger range of possibilities for thought and action about education.

For example, knowledge need not be viewed as information, and learning need not be only its collection based upon mastery of behavioral habits. This conception seems to have great potency today, witness the popularity of Benjamin Bloom's Mastery Learning as well as Performance-Based Teacher Education. Yet knowledge may also be seen as the structured consequence of problem solving, and learning as the habit of inquiry and discovery. Knowledge, in addition, may be considered to be a human creation, with learning being the power of invention. Or knowledge can be viewed as that which approximates an ideal; learning here is the dialectical approach to that ideal. Each of these conceptions radically transforms how we view ourselves and our activities.

The widest possible consideration of alternatives is that which will be most conducive to fruitful reflection on the character of our activities as educators. In no way do I intend to suggest that we eliminate technical language or reject the conception of knowledge as information and learning as behavioral skill. What I do object to is the degradation of such language and knowledge current today. And here is the place where each of us may individually and directly affect the future of higher education, namely, in our own teaching and research and discussions of education.

Moreover, if we are reflective in our activities, the dichotomies noted in the foregoing papers may lead from dilemma to dialogue and the creative transformation of present circumstances. The opposition, for example, of intellectualism and vocationalism may be transformed if the play of ideas characteristic of the former at its best becomes part of the education for the latter. If vocationalism is seen to be practice based on deliberation about alternate courses of action, not as mindless motion derived from trained rule, theory and practice may supplement and reinvigorate each other. The opposition of quantity and quality, moreover, need not be considered fixed; their opposition may lead to the stimulation of judgment as to where and how each is appropriate, even to the recognition that, at least in human beings, one need not preclude the other. Human nature is *not* a fixed entity; its pliability, as well as its possibility for development, has been, is, and will continue to be substantial. In the opposition of power between government and higher education, a reflective reconsideration of the latter's central purposes may encourage the construction of a less diffuse, more powerful defense of the necessity of its

autonomy. As politicians are made more aware of what the college and university are essentially about and as the professoriate rededicates itself to its professional responsibilities, both sides may approach a better understanding of what, in many respects, is their common purpose. Finally, the current economic strictures in higher education may, in the long run and in spite of the real pain caused in the crisis, be a stimulant to the resolution of the oppositions just noted. They may even be a blessing in disguise for two reasons. First, limited resources do force reflection on what *are* the essential functions of higher education; if the responses currently being made are misguided, their consequences may well be used to demonstrate the necessity of more enlightened ones. At least, discussion will be generated about common problems, and the alternatives institutionally available will more likely be given serious consideration. Second, and possibly more important, limited resources may tend to encourage pursuit of a career in education only by those whose dedication to the profession is substantial. Education is most emphatically not just a way to earn a living; it is a calling, a true profession, one whose rewards are incalculable and immaterial.

We are, indeed, living through a revolution in higher education; and to paraphrase Charles Dickens' description of another revolution, these are the best of times, these are the worst of times. Most importantly, these are the times for each of us to do his and her best.

Whither Academia?

John Fizer
Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures
Rutgers University
31 Mine Street
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903

> Reasoning is an argument in which certain things being laid down, something different from the posita happens from necessity through the things laid down.
>
> *Aristotle*

In moments of social crisis, whatever their nature and cause, it pays to ponder the validity of the established forms of our institutions. It pays to subject them to radical inquiry and, if need be, to transvaluate in them everything that is transvaluable. A reluctance to do this blurs our vision of what is inevitable and what is superfluous.

The system of our higher education is no exception to this process even though it is a system *sui generis*, i.e. unlike some other systems, it forms our values and preferences while being formed by them at the same time. It is the subject and object of its own dialectics. Hence, an inquiry into this system might easily be an inquiry into our own desiderata rather than into what Durkheim called "objective criteria, inherent in the facts themselves."

In this essay I would like to ponder some of the established forms of our doctoral programs in the field of humanistic studies. At the very onset I want to observe that many of these programs have reached a point of total inertia. In some sense they have become impediments rather than viable instruments of advanced knowledge. I do not have in mind the rampant production of doctors of philosophy which almost doubled between 1966 and 1980[1] nor do I think of the emotional agonies of those who by their sheer number swell the statistics of the unemployed and unemployable. Like the quantities of many other things that we produce, their number is to a certain extent the result of our economic *modus operandi*. We let the micro-structure of our economic system operate according to its immediate needs and whims and worry about over- or under-production *post factum*. One's

predilection for or aversion to this mode of operation is a matter of ideological faith.

What I have in mind is the structure of our doctoral programs. It seems to me that amidst the new realities of our time many of these programs have become inadequate and perhaps even obsolete and therefore need to be radically rethought and perhaps substantially restructured. In terms of their productivity they surpass the needs of our society, and in terms of their intellectual objectives many of them have become mere exercises in sterile academic liturgy. The extent of their empty ritualism differs from discipline to discipline. In my view many doctoral programs in "professional education" are the most explicit example of this ritual. Here language operates primarily on the phonetic level. It has lost its semantic stratum. It is a strange pseudo-poetry with little or no reference to the historical reality with which it propounds to be concerned. It is madly in love with its own rhetorics, which it considers to be conceptual analogues to reality. Perhaps it would be amusing if it did not have such deleterious effects upon our cultural life. But it does have these, and beyond our wildest imagination. A great many doctors of humanities whose degrees were awarded in 1979 will go on performing more liturgies and producing more doctors of education. The case of the other fields of social sciences and humanities might not be as dramatically derisive as that of some professional education, but they too are not free of this ritualism. They too partake in the massive intellectual deception that adds what Erich Fromm called "systematic dysfunctioning" to our culture.

Inexpedient Expediences

We can conjecture *ad nauseam* about the empirically precise cause of the inadequacies of our doctoral programs, but it would do us no good. Yet, as a matter of pure speculation, we can say that at their very root lies some perverted pragmatism which postulates the subordination of all logical reflection to the immediacies of practical life. Consequently, as in most of the things we do, our actions in academia become limited to the present moment and our behavior becomes a series of isolated "operations" with limited concern for their protracted duration. We eagerly and earnestly engage in "operation Vietnam," "operation business," "operation Ph.D. in semiotics" or what have you, only because we believe that at this moment these

are the things to do. There is no true time dimension to these operations. They are hedonistically intensified quests, variants on the Lucretian dictum "carpe diem." With this kind of approach to life one can succeed in maximizing the production of hot dogs and soft drinks, but in regard to such "products" as knowledge, it fails to work. Here the immediacies of practical life must often be suspended. Gratification of the present moment must be postponed. As Kant would put it, the perception of the thing must be coupled with its conception or, as we would put it nowadays, the synchronic view must be qualified by the diachronic one. The present and future must complement each other. In brief, the cultivation of knowledge must be carefully planned. Yet planning is not a simple undertaking. In the same manner that overstressed perception (the present) can eliminate a meaningful conception (the future), overstressed conception can make us oblivious to our perception. Planning is a reasonable balance between the two.[2]

It is my view that the present malaise of doctoral programs in our country emanates among other things from insufficient planning and coordination on the national scale. By inertia, our universities continue to fancy themselves as islands unto themselves beyond which there is no viable academic life. Or should there be an awareness of other universities, like good industrial enterprises they want to outdo them. They remind me of the old Hobbsian dictum "Bellum omnium contra omnes." Well, this competitive philosophy might work in the production and the abundance, diversity and quality of material goods, but in the "production" of high-quality doctorates it does not.

Hence, it seems to me, several assumptions are valid: a) Doctoral programs cannot be created and maintained simply because it is fashionable to have them, b) They are to be conceived from the perspective of local and national needs. They are not merely to enhance "the prestige of an institution," merely "to accommodate a group of educators," merely "to make a university's program more versatile," etc. Academic expansion based on such criteria is absurd. Hence, mutual *planning* as well as mutual *containment* is an antecedent condition of a meaningful system of higher education. Each program in graduate studies must stand in complementary relation rather than in competitively hostile opposition to the other programs.

I have no practical scheme for bringing these presently discordant programs into a closely cooperating consortium. I for one am against

a "Ministry of Education" which regulates the delicate educational process by a cumbersome bureaucratic machine. Centralization is both foreign to our way of life and stifling to creative diversity. Yet I am confident that with good will and concerted effort an adequate form of cooperation could be found. For example, there are approximately two dozen history departments in the country in which one can obtain a doctorate in Russian and East Slavic History. They produce annually a score of doctors of good or dubious quality for about 1–5 openings. Some of these departments have neither sufficient library resources nor eminent scholars to supervise doctoral research and dissertations. For reasons of their own they perpetuate programs that are of no use or value to anyone. The administrative officers of these departments could come to an agreement that their scholarly activity must be commensurate with the general needs of the country and hence only departments that are found to be excellent should be retained. In my own field, comparative and Slavic literatures, there are doctoral programs that clearly have no right to exist. These should be disposed of. But how? Perhaps through very stringent outside evaluations, if not through the consensus of those involved in them. Perhaps we have arrived at a point where we must formulate national standards for each academic field that have to be consistently satisfied and where programs that fail to meet these criteria should be temporarily or permanently dismantled. But above all new doctoral programs must not be instituted unless there is an explicit national need for them, unless there is adequate institutional support for them, and unless there are nationally recognized scholars who can supervise them. Or, if this type of revision is impossible and we are to proceed with the present model of doctoral programs, the doctor of philosophy degree must be stripped of all the functions that we customarily ascribe to it.

Time to Revise the "American Model"

In this country we have developed an "American model" of doctoral programs. Its locus rests in the "department" rather than in the professor's specialty. It is the department that trains the candidate, provides him with "everything" that he needs academically, and finally certifies him as competent in his chosen field. Accordingly, our departments seem to be self-sufficient and hence closed structures. Here and there they might be serviced by other departments on

some marginal issue, but normally they shun departmental interdependency. Interdisciplinary scholarship, the only sensible approach to the "verbal sciences," is still a stepchild in the American university. Instead of being a central methodology of every humanistic discipline, it exists as a separate discipline. After entering a department the doctoral candidate is kept inside by the closely structured Ph.D. requirements. He is discouraged from taking courses outside the department. He has to take X number of departmental courses, pass his comprehensive examination, write a thesis, and leave. During his "residence" there is seldom a focus to what he does. He is responsible to the collective "wisdom" of the department. He has to demonstrate his "comprehensive knowledge" of his field in a "comprehensive examination." And who are his "comprehensive mentors"? They are the members of a department that ranks them in four categories, awards them accordingly, but also insists on a certain uniformity. Here, academic rank does not always reflect academic achievement. One is frequently made a "professor" because of one's length of teaching experience or because of "general usefulness" to the university or, lately, because of one's sex or ethnic minority. In some departments it is not unusual to meet freshly-minted doctors or would-be doctors who teach graduate courses and, alas, even supervise doctoral dissertations.

Perhaps this kind of departmentalization gives high yields in the "exact" and "natural sciences," but in "humanistic studies" it often has an adverse effect upon the candidate's intellectual growth. After several years of coursework in the department he grows exhausted, he becomes incapable of *his* point of view, he begins to dream of one thing—to get it over with and get a job. If he has not become an exact replica of his department at the end of this monotonous ordeal, he is at best apathetic to what it stands for. The majority of our Ph.D.'s never recover from this ordeal. Upon receiving the coveted degree, they are reluctant to continue their search for knowledge. A few will spend a number of years converting their dissertation into publishable form. The rest don't even bother with that. Isn't it strange that only about 4–5% of those who receive doctorates engage in further research and writing? What happens to the other 95%? Why do they withdraw from active scholarship? I believe that the answer to this question must be sought in the very structure of our doctoral programs. It seems that it is there that the intellectual curiosity of the potential scholar is blunted

or even suppressed. Lucky are those who meet in the department a scholar who will save them from the collective mediocrity and will encourage them to go beyond the comprehensive requirements of the department. But how many departments have such dissident scholars? Especially at this time when administrators keep close tabs on teacher-student ratios in departments? The more students the department recruits, the better its image in the eyes of the university's bureaucracy. A quantitative assessment of a professor's teaching has become the most important criterion of his usefulness to the university.

If the existing model of our doctoral programs is as delimiting as I presented it, what is a better alternative? Should it be revised or replaced with something radically different? I do not believe in revolutionary methods. The departmental structure does have some positive features, such as the horizontal organization of the discipline, which should be preserved to some extent. Yet in order to make it more responsive to the specific needs and interests and the intellectual curiosity of the aspiring doctoral candidate,[3] it (a) must have an open structure and (b) must have autonomous chairs whose academic competence and authority are not subject to departmental curtailment, as well as (c) doctoral programs that are set up vertically rather than *in extenso*. In brief, what I am suggesting is that doctoral students be given broader freedom than they have under the existing system to take courses and read in accordance with their nascent intellectual interests. For example, if they are fascinated by "literary history," they should be encouraged to take courses in the methodology of historical research, in historiography and the philosophy of history and the like, rather than take irrelevant courses in biographical trivia simply because they are departmental courses; they should read what enriches their particular interest, what builds their methodological know-how and what exposes them to intellectual accomplishments of value to them. No attempt should be made to make them "experts in the discipline" as a whole because in the field of humanistic studies such a thing is a total fiction. St. H. Spurr expressed the following view on the existing form of our doctoral programs: "Degree structure should be flexible enough to facilitate the student's finding a place in the system of higher education appropriate to his current interests and abilities. Additionally, he should have the opportunity of movement consonant with the development of his

motivation, abilities and performance'' (*Academic Degree Structure*: Innovative Approaches, p. 22). Today this view is particularly cogent.

Potential Consequences

If my views were adopted, what possible consequences would result from them? It is difficult to envisage the full spectrum of changes that would occur. For one thing, there would be a sizable contraction of doctoral programs. In a regional or even national consortium of graduate programs it would be imperative to refrain from unnecessary duplication. Doctoral programs would have to be ''apportioned'' on the basis of academic strength, library resources, and general needs. Through such a consortium graduate schools would enter into binding agreements as to their area of specialization. This would in turn enhance the prestige and importance of the schools that have existed in the shadow of a few nationally prominent universities. Hence, a small and hitherto insignificant university would, by the consensus of the consortium, take upon itself the development and maintenance of one or two doctoral programs and thus be in the same league as the more eminent schools. For another thing, my views would slow down substantially the proliferation of doctorates and might in part restore the prestige that this degree used to enjoy. If what I am saying, however, and, to be sure, what has been said before by many critics of our doctoral programs, is impossible to implement, then perhaps we must introduce an additional academic degree which would rectify the present deficiencies of our doctoral programs. In Europe this is practiced in many countries. In some, like Germany and the Central European countries, one must take the *Habilitation* in order to secure a university position. In France, there is the Doctor of Science or Letters and in the USSR the Doctor of Science. And if we do not do this, we might indeed heed the advice of Barzun and give every graduate student a doctorate at the beginning of his graduate studies and then ''dedoctorilize'' him at the end of his successful work. Thus, under my proposal, only the students who are genuinely committed to scholarship would be admitted to the degree since a numerical quota would lose its overriding importance as a justification for the existence of the department. Systematic teaching in the department would be done on the undergraduate and master's degree levels. Doctoral work would be done primarily by means of pro-

seminars and seminars, colloquia, reading and research. The departments would stop treating these as their sole prerogative. They would be taken on the advice of the professor under whose aegis the student pursues his studies. As a matter of principle and intellectual expediency, doctoral work would not be confined to one specific department. It would be an open-ended process, emphasizing independent effort and true autonomy of intellectual inquiry. At the same time it would not be devoid of a programmatic approach. Such a structure would "marginally reduce the pervasive influence of the academic guild" (Juncks and Riesman, 1968) of doctoral programs as they are instituted at the present time. Again to illustrate this by means of an example from the field of history, let me say that a doctoral candidate interested in the Renaissance would not be coerced to take courses in, for example, the Ming dynasty or in Latin American history, but rather courses in the departments of art, philosophy, music and classics which pertain to the Renaissance. Such an arrangement of the candidate's work would expose him to related disciplines as well as give his studies a thematic focus. Moreover, he would not have to be trained or retrained for interdisciplinary projects because his specialization would already be both mono- and interdisciplinary.

Furthermore, teachers in graduate departments, realizing that in order to participate in the doctoral programs they must achieve general recognition in their specialty, would have to dedicate themselves totally to it. This might by itself reduce considerably the widespread practice on our campuses whereby "professors" engage gladly in a variety of administrative work. Instead of seeking authority in their intellectual sustenance, these "professors" seek power in bureaucracy. Instead of being intellectuals, they become "deanlings," quasi-councilors of extra-curricular activities, or simply frustrated would-be politicians who create a pseudo-political atmosphere in which a dedicated scholar is treated as an object of administrative manipulation. If my views were adopted, our universities might once more become communities of scholars.

And, finally, my views could have a marked effect upon the university's budget. Inasmuch as departments do not have to be comprehensive but judiciously selective, graduate schools would not have to invest huge sums of money for programs that are conducted better elsewhere.

I am aware that my somewhat passionate remarks raise more

questions than they answer, that they could be interpreted variously, and that they imply more than they state. Nevertheless, I feel that in times like ours we must test and challenge the norms of our institutional behavior. We must ask ourselves whether these norms are "conducive to optional functioning and minimal waste of energy" (Fromm). My remarks posit a thesis that they do not and that the search for their meaningful revision must be intensified.

Notes

[1]S. J. Boyer observes that ". . . another 340,000 doctorates are likely to be produced in the present decade, 1971–1980." (*The Doctoral Dissertation as an Information Source*, 1973, p. 13.) Between 1960 and 1974 the production of doctorates tripled (10,000 : 33,000). Between 1920 and 1974 it increased almost sixty times (560 : 33,000).

[2]It was also Kant who observed in his famous *Prolegoma* that "plan-making is often a luxurious and pretentious mental occupation, whereby one acquires the reputation of a creative genius by demanding what one cannot achieve oneself, by conserving what one cannot improve and by proposing what one does not know how to find."

[3]As early as 1903 William James urged our universities to look for faculty of substance and suggested that highly gifted students follow *freely* their more immediate intellectual aims.

Coming

Special Topic Editions

Call for Articles

1981 – Educational Futures

Contact the Editors:

Fred Kierstead
University of Houston at Clear Lake City
2700 Bay Area Boulevard
Houston, Texas 77058

Sherry L. Schiller
Oakland Schools
2100 Pontiac Lake Road
Pontiac, Michigan 48054

Dennis Van Avery
Westminster College
1840 South 13th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

1982 – Communication in the Classroom

Contact the Editor:

Roger M. Babich
Department of Communication
780 Van Vleet Oval
University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma 73019

The Scientific Movement: American Education and the Emergence of the Technological Society

Richard Nelson
Department of Philosophy and Education
Gustavus Adolphus College
St. Peter, Minnesota 56082

Joseph Watras
Department of Education
University of Dayton
300 College Park
Dayton, Ohio 45469

In his book *Road to Wigan Pier*, George Orwell describes rows of public project houses, built for people who were so poor that they were living in abandoned cars and buses, tar paper shacks, or with no shelter at all. The houses were row upon row the same low-cost, pre-fabricated construction, but they were warm, clean and dry. To claim these houses, the needy had to submit to a delousing examination. A perfectly understandable regulation, acknowledges Orwell, for otherwise their new homes would soon become as squalid and infested as their old ones. Yet, he says, there is a sense of rebellion one feels at the injustice of forcing people to undergo such a degrading examination to claim a home. He came to suspect that the price of freedom is less eternal vigilance than eternal dirt.[1]

The tragic dimension of the modern experience is that in our Faustian desire to unlock the secrets of progress, in order to escape the bondage of the human condition, we have had to accept the bondage of technology. The modern tellers of the Faust legend have improved upon the story to allow the Medieval fallen man to become a hero. In the American version, Daniel Webster outwits Scratch and gets his client off clean. But the escape from the dues exacted by technology is not so easily accomplished. Like Faust we have been granted undreamed of possibilities and at a very high price.[2]

A case in point is seen in one of the great economic and social events of modern times: the phenomenon of Henry Ford and the development of the concept of mass production. Ford, of course, was not the inventor of mass production and the assembly line method. Eli Whitney had pioneered this concept as early as 1798, and others had used these ideas even before him. But Ford was the first to put all the

aspects of modern industrial work together at one time; cheap production, and a low selling price, with a high rate of pay for workers. Five dollars a day for unskilled work was a high wage for that time (though Ford later failed to keep salaries up). Five hundred dollars for the Model A was far below the price of other automobiles and as a result Ford grew rich and the River Rouge Plant became the greatest factory of its type in the world. But Ford had found more than a new way to make money. He expressed the ideal of an age and in doing so, says Peter Drucker, he appeared to solve the economic dilemmas of the 19th century.[3]

For the economists of the 19th century, who accepted the iron law of wages, prosperity of capital depended upon the continued impoverishment of labor. Profits depended upon buying raw materials cheaply, manufacturing at the lowest possible wage and selling for the dearest possible price. Marx recognized that this meant the impossibility of rapprochement between workers and capitalists. The prosperity of the one contradicted the aspirations of the other. Economic imperialism became necessary to assure cheap raw materials for factories at home.

The limited resources of the world meant the rape of the weaker by the stronger nations, and of the workers by the capitalists. Sweat shops and crowded tenements in the cities, unsafe working conditions, impoverishment of the farmers and despair for the old, sick and disabled were the fruits for the masses in the age of the entrepreneur. Such a state of affairs could not continue forever. Marx saw its end in revolution and the dawn of a new age.

Henry Ford's factory offered another alternative. His innovation made practical the utopian ideals expressed by the workers' parties of the 1830's, the unions and by visionaries like Owens and Bellamy. By producing more at a lower cost, sales climbed. More sales meant more profits, even at the lower margin, leading to still more prosperity for all. By paying a higher wage a huge consumer group was created. The fears of the 19th century were, it seemed, unfounded. Once more, mass production made work lighter, and more efficient. The worker could arrive home with energy to spare, with sunlight left in the day and money left in his pocket. He could spend his free time advancing himself culturally or riding in his car.

Here was the dream of workers finally fulfilled. The worker could become a professional. Equality of the masses was possible after all.

Surely this explains the popularity of the automobile. For the desire for convenience—to get from one place to another sitting down—could not be the reason for its success. The owner spent more time underneath, pushing out of mud, and cranking it than he did sitting in it. Rather, the appeal was in the dream of mobility and the equality it represented. Even the well-to-do, in cars costing three times the price, had to follow the same rules of driving as did the worker. Enough people with the same dream could make the dream a reality. As more cars were sold, roads eventually had to be built to accomodate them. The dream of mobility and freedom was made a reality by the sheer number of dreamers.

The technology Ford unleashed devoured, in a short time, the small town, the farm and the innocence of an earlier era. His museum at Dearborne, filled with artifacts of early Americana, is a fitting memorial to a way of life his cars helped make extinct. But the real tragic flaw in Ford's solution lay deeper than this. Ford had answered all the dilemmas of 19th century economics, except one.

Marx's critique of industry was that the worker was alienated from his labor. This meant that no amount of money can pay for a man's life, and it is his life he trades for his wage. If a man cannot control the work of his hands he becomes a stranger in the world. The price of mass production was the exacerbation of alienation. To put one bolt on one wheel of an endless succession of partially completed cars is the acceptance of a world of total alienation. The very process that liberates man from his servitude also liberates him from his history and selfhood. The assembly line, like the modern research lab, makes each activity a standard unit. As the worker or scientist is made a professional, he is also, and at the same time, made superfluous.

It is this flaw in the modern ideal of progress that has eluded modern man, turning his solutions into seeds of new dissatisfactions. But it was, nevertheless, this ideal that Ford's mass production grew out of and groped towards. Ford's solution was in the spirit of the age. His was only the last and most practical of numerous enterprises. A bicycle company had already used the assembly line technique and Leland had used interchangeable parts at his Cadillac plant before Ford. In a related vein, unionism had become a force in American working life, and industrial betterment projects like Pullman's model town of the 1880's and John Patterson's national cash register campaigns had attempted to prevent labor troubles through paternalistic schemes.[4]

But perhaps more than any of these, the spirit of the age was captured by a mechanical engineer named Frederich Winslow Taylor. Taylor, the child of wealthy Philadelphia philanthropists, was born in 1856. He rejected a career in law and instead entered the factory as an apprentice pattern maker. During his career, he served as President of the American Society of Mechanical Engineering. At the age of 45, he retired to devote his energies to finding a solution to the problem of labor and management. Taylor was the creator of Scientific Management, which turned efficiency into a craze and made it the watchword for a whole society. Once more, Taylor was, in his own person, a bridge between the Social Darwinists and the Reform Darwinists; between the age of big business and the era of technology; between the eras of production and information.

In order to appreciate the impact of Taylor's system for subsequent educational and social events, the almost religious awe associated with efficiency that followed in his wake needs to be understood.

By the beginning of the second decade of the 20th century, "efficiency" was the cry heard in every corner of American life. Efficiency was not merely a term used by businessmen to describe a high rate of return on an investment. More importantly, it was used to describe the social relations of men. Efficiency meant social harmony, the overcoming of class tensions. It meant hard work, dependability and virtuous behavior. Ministers saw sin in terms of inefficiency in society and in one's personal life. Success and failure in school, or business or in any other aspect of social life was seen as a matter of efficient programming.[5]

Efficiency was a word and an ideal born of the heady promise created out of the technological success of the age. The use of the word derived from the laws of thermodynamics. It referred to the amount of energy lost, as heat was changed to power in a steam engine. The less waste, the more power available for work and therefore, the higher the efficiency of the machine.[6] For a country intoxicated by the power of steamboats and railroads the analogy was apt. Once more, it offered everyone his own private vision for American renewal.

The progressives were quite at home with such a metaphor. Because they saw the problem of evil in society as the problem of management, their concept of the expert social engineer who by superior planning would overcome the abuses of society, fit perfectly

the ideal of efficiency. Conservative business interests could join with the progressives in lauding efficiency, as well. To them efficiency meant an end to soldiering on the job, work slow-downs and the possibility of higher profits. Efficiency offered the masses the outlet for their striving for a better life. It offered a vision of total productivity, raising prospects for a more fruitful and enjoyable life and an avenue to respectability. It was this expectation and striving which produced and then made Henry Ford rich. But the emanating force that gave substance and power to the ideal of efficiency and around whom the great excitement about efficiency revolved in the public mind was Taylor and his theory of scientific management.

Taylor believed that problems of labor and management could be solved by scientific means. Labor, he observed, wants the highest possible pay for their work. The employer, on the other hand, wishes to pay the lowest possible wage in order to gain the largest possible profits. As a result, greed and suspicion pervade industrial relations. Taylor's solution was to make the self-interest of the employer and employee the same. The way to do this, he said, was to use scientific standards to calculate production rates. By breaking the movements of a job down to elementary units of activity, and by subjecting these units to time and motion studies, a fair rate of production could be factually discovered, eliminating the effects of greed and suspicion. The worker would know that his wage was based upon a fair standard, not upon the whim of his employer. The employer, on the other hand, would have an accurate production rate to judge workmen's performance rather than a hit or miss guess. In addition, a scientific study of labor would eliminate wasted activity and counter-productive methods. By subdividing work into elementary units and discovering the laws of efficient action; by standardizing tools and movements, using slide rules and other such devices, Taylor argued that more productivity could be gotten out of each workman. Applying these rules, he predicted increased productivity, less fatigue, higher wages, better working conditions and more fulfilled workmen.[7]

Taylor was not a romantic about human nature. He believed man to be lazy, greedy, tricky and generally untrustworthy. Although always professing respect for the workingman, he commonly referred to them as drays and donkeys. He is famous for his remark about the men most fit to shovel pig iron as being of the type of the ox—so stupid as to be capable of little else.[8]

But, to Taylor's mind, the wonderful thing about scientific management was that it could turn the limitations of men to their own advantage. Due to the hard work and monotony involved, only one man in eight was of such a type as to be a productive and capable pig iron shoveler. The hit and miss quality of industry could never discover that one man to fit the job. Scientific management, however, could fit the right man with the right job.[9]

In Taylor's scheme, the workman should be given the highest grade of work for which his ability and physique fit him. Each workman so selected should be paid according to the maximum amount of work which a first-rate worker could produce. Each worker who worked at his best rate was to be paid 30%–100% more than his fellows, according to the nature of the work. Thus, every worker was to be paid individually according to his own ambitions. The tendency to slow down to the pace of the slowest worker was eliminated by the possibility of individual reward. In raising each workman to the highest level for which he was capable, by inducing him to use his best faculties, by forcing him to remain energetic and giving him sufficient pay to live better than in the past, the worker was uplifted in his personal life and his productivity improved as well.[10]

It would be a great mistake to see Taylor as simply an apologist for big business using his science to manipulate more work from the laboring man. Such a view neither squares with the facts of Taylor's life and ideas nor does it give an insight into the appeal scientific management had for the times. Taylor had little more patience with employers than he did with labor. For example, he quit (or was fired) from his project at Bethlehem Steel over a fight with management. Management wished to retain too much control over the running of the plant and Taylor wanted all decisions placed in the hands of the scientific planners.[11]

Indeed, the flurry of interest behind Taylor's system came suddenly when it was used to fight the forces of big business in the famous Eastern Rate Case of 1910–11. The railroads of the Northeast had requested an increase in rates. They were opposed by a team of trade commission lawyers led by Louis Brandeis. Squeezed by inflation and angered by the gouging tactics of big business, the middle class responded with enthusiasm when Brandeis argued that higher rates were not the answer. He promised that scientific management could save the railroads as much as a million dollars per day, and called efficiency experts to prove it.[12]

The Interstate Commerce Commission decided against approving the price hike, but the testimony of the efficiency experts was not the decisive factor. The Commission noted that scientific management was too new for anyone to be certain its effects would be as the experts said.[13]

The Commerce Commission may have been unconvinced, but the public was sold. The case drew wide publicity, filling the newspapers and the public imagination. Every phase of social life was affected in the wave of popularity that followed the case. Feminists sought to bring the principles of scientific management to the home to release women from the drudgery of housework. They hoped that, if scientific management could bring professionalization to the business, it could bring professionalization to the home. Ministers talked of adapting the organizational tactics of the factory to church work. Socialists were friendly to the ideas, but were reluctant to commit themselves.[14]

Resistance came from labor unions. Siding with the railroads in the rate case, the unions saw Taylor's plan as a way to eliminate jobs. Taylor argued the unions had nothing to fear from his system. He supported unionism and thought collective bargaining had a place in his system.[15]

As a mechanical engineer, Taylor's drive for efficiency was not motivated by love of profits. On the contrary, he was incensed at the refusal of businessmen to accept complete standardization. Because the successful factory owner needed only to be more efficient than his competitor, Taylor railed against the constant temptation to stop with halfway measures. His passion was a passion for system. For this reason, he argued that scientific management was not the gimmicks associated with it in the public mind. It was not time-motion studies, not standardized tools or bonus systems. Scientific management, he said, was a mental state. Unless the mental state was achieved, the individual aspects of the program would fail.[16]

The nature of the mental revolution Taylor was advocating consisted in the substitution of peace and harmony through a scientific approach, for the discord, strife and confusion existing in the working world as it was. "No dictator can rule where scientific management holds sway," testified Taylor before the Congress in 1912. "The man at the head of the business under scientific management governed by rules and laws which have been developed through hundreds of

experiments just as the workman is, and the standards which have been developed are equitable. . . '' he stated in his testimony.[17]

Taylor's popularity did not rest upon the favor of big business and a general selling-out to big business by society. Rather, Taylor offered an equitable way of dealing with a mass society. In his system, individual initiative could be retained without the excesses of rugged individualism as seen in business tycoons.[18] Once more resources, human and industrial, could be managed for the better life of all. Taylor did not conceive of his program as a way of squeezing the last ounce of work from laborers. Prime rate of work was computed on the long-range health and accuracy of the worker. Overwork was as inefficient as underwork. By finding the optimum point of production, both the worker and employer were equally protected.[19]

Taylor's vision is closely paralleled by B. F. Skinner's *Today*. Like Skinner, Taylor saw that waste and inefficiency could be eliminated by applying scientific principles of behavioral management to human affairs. Like Skinner, Taylor distrusted the cult of personality and urged management on grounds of efficient principles instead. Also, like Skinner, Taylor saw that using such a method would increase men's leisure, avoid overwork and generally make life more pleasant and harmonious. Despite the differences between Skinner's utopia and the moral order advocated by Taylor, their point of view is remarkably similar. Perhaps the popularity of Skinner's vision today among both liberals and conservatives gives some insight into the popularity of Taylor's more practical system at the turn of the century.

In any case, Taylor's vision, like Henry Ford's, expressed the aspirations of the time and was a means of defusing its dangers as well. The schools quickly joined the chorus of support for Taylor's methods. Again the reasons were not only economic, though Taylor's efficiency methods offered what school administrators saw as good financial accountability.[20] More importantly, school systems turned to Taylor's system as a way to prove they were doing the best job they could in the same way as contemporary schools are turning to Skinner's psychology and vocabulary of behavioral objectives and behavior modification to show their efforts are soundly based.

The new crowded classrooms could not be left to a hit-or-miss style of teaching. The dabbling or weak teaching methods of the old normal school had to go. Better, more effective methods had to be found and

used. Supervision of teachers on the job had to become more effective as the size of school buildings increased. At the same time, the abilities and needs of this larger group of students had to be discovered, sorted out, and attended to. Scientific management promised to provide the means for solving these growing problems of education in a mass society.

Perhaps the most influential supporter of the scientific management in the schools was John Franklin Bobbitt. Bobbitt argued for the need to eliminate waste in education. In an article published in *Elementary School Teacher* in 1912, Bobbitt decried the fact that the typical school plant was used only 50% of the time.[21] He cited with approval the educational engineer in the Gary Public Schools who set his task at operating at 100% efficiency during the school hours. To achieve maximum efficiency, the school should be open Saturday, Sundays and summers as well, recommended Bobbitt. To conserve money, he recommended reducing the number of staff and developing specialization within the staff of the school. Finally, Bobbitt recommended that the education of the school should be geared to the individual's capabilities. "Work up the raw material into that finished product for which it is best adopted," he said. Bobbitt advocated, as Herbert Kliebard noted, a form of quality control in the classroom, arguing for the need of "definate qualitative and quantitative standards to be determined for the product."[22] In the railroad industry, Bobbitt observed, each rail "must be thirty feet in length and weigh eighty pounds to the yard. It must be seven and three-eighths inches in height, with a head two and one sixty-fourths of an inch in thickness and five inches deep, and a base five inches wide." Bobbitt recommended the same vigorous accounting of time and resources in the schoolhouse. Herbert Kliebard cites an illustration of the translation of this ideal to classroom practice. Based upon a number of studies, Bobbitt concluded that the third grade teacher should produce from her pupils an average of 26 correct arithmetical computations per minute. The fourth grade teacher should raise the rate to 34. Less than 34 is a failure of duty, said Bobbitt, but there is no need for her to strive beyond that standard number.[23] Bobbitt was enthralled with the cost analysis that had become associated with industry since the advent of scientific management techniques. The railroad knows the price per mile of locomotive repair, the cost of lubricating oils and rail production and repair. The schools, said

Bobbitt, need to compute their costs on the same basis. Using cost per thousand student hours, Bobbitt could report the cost of instruction in the various disciplines. He noted, for example, that Latin was 20% more expensive than arithmetic.[24]

Bobbitt was not so crass as to suggest that a rigid cost accounting system should run the curriculum. In the same article in which he lauded the railroad's ability to predict costs to the penny, "High School Costs," published in 1915, he said that the use of this technique was not meant to be used in a hard and fast way in the schools. Rather it was a changing rule of thumb to help the school administrator use his limited resources most judiciously. If, said Bobbitt, the average cost of an English program is $50 per 1,000 student hours and a school is spending $75 on a program giving only average results, the program needs evaluation and correction. Likewise, if only $30 is being spent, here is an indication that the school may be short-changing its English program. Certainly this fact basis of judgement is superior to mere arbitrary opinion, he reasoned.[25]

Similarly, Bobbitt's demand for 100% efficiency in the use of the school plant did not necessarily mean turning it into a factory for students. He advocated that the top floors of the school be turned into art museums and that the school should be used as a community culture and art center. "The great mass of people are emancipated from heavy labor for a considerable portion of the day," wrote Bobbitt in 1911 in an article entitled "A City School as a Community Art and Musical Center."[26] With up to 36 hours a week for leisure, even laborers now could avail themselves of the cultural aspects of life. The schools should lead in the possibility of uplift this entailed. For the same reasons of increased leisure, Bobbitt feared the undermining of the school's influence. The positive aspects of school should not be lost to alley time, he wrote in "The Elimination of Waste in Education" in 1912.[27] The school should maximize its influence by providing organized play before and after hours of classes. "There is a definite intention of making the school the recreation center for the city," wrote Bobbitt.[28] Separate municipal parks, for example, were seen as wasteful and counter-productive. The greater the involvement of the school in all aspects of life, the more effective its influence would grow. Despite the intrusion of the school that this implies, it should be noted that Bobbitt advocated voluntary attendance, not coercion. When this was done in Gary, he said, one-half the children enrolled in the school attended.[29]

Nor were teachers to be treated like automatons of standardization. The highest efficiency demands qualities of personality gained only by socializing among one's fellows, explained Bobbitt. "One cannot be a proper teacher if he does not engage in the many varied activities that are normal for every completely developed human creature."[30] Teachers, he said, are expected to live like other people, and when their day is done they should not be burdened with papers and planning.[31]

Well before 1920, such important educational theorists as David Snedden and W. W. Charters joined Bobbitt in his attempt to bring efficient management to curriculum as well as to administrative functions in the schools.[32] Snedden saw the question of method to be at the heart of the problem of education for a mass society. Except in rare cases of genius or defect, he wrote in *Sociological Determinations of Objectives in Education*, individual qualifications cannot be the basis of education. In education, as in war, industry, transportation, worship, housing and entertainment, economy and efficiency require that people be dealt with in squads, platoons and divisions. Individual instruction, he continued, is a luxury for the elite, but is not practical for teaching the masses.[33] At the same time, he rejected an educational procrustean bed that had no room for individual differences or changing social needs. The solution for Snedden, like Bobbitt, was supplied by scientific management. By breaking the teaching act, learning and the curriculum into the smallest standardized units, the most efficient use of time and materials would be available with the widest possible alternatives. Echoing Bobbitt's enthusiasm for the Gary plan, Snedden argued that its great strength was that it was not a rigid and standardized program, but a flexible program full of the spirit of experimentalism. "We do so easily become the victims of the machinery and routines which we set up," he mused. "We feel we must compel everybody, make everything obligatory, in order to succeed."[34] His fear, like Taylor's, was that the higher purposes of management might not be recognized by petty minds. The flexible ideal of the efficiency experts, he said, allowed for some children leaving school earlier than others, of courses being offered that all need not take, of special arrangements for dancing, music lessons and other cultural events outside the school. The school should provide play, art, science, manual training and physical training. The school should offer all possible things to all people, young and old.[35]

Such liberal educational programming was needed, argued Snedden, if the responsibility of the schools to a mass society was to be realized. But this was only possible within a context of a specific concept of the school's purpose and at least a tentative detailed plan for implementing it. "Efficiency in education, as elsewhere in the regions of conscious effort," he wrote in the *Atlantic Monthly* in 1912, "involves on the one hand a fairly clear conception of the goals to be reached, and on the other a degree of certitude as to the probable functioning of the means employed."[36] This, of course, implied the use of standardized tests, standardized curriculums, and work units, and an emphasis upon vocational guidance; all with an eye to the practical needs of industry. After all, as Bobbitt explained, "The management predetermines with great exactness the nature of the product to be turned out, and in relation to the other factors, the quality of the output."[37]

Just as Taylor's system attempted to maximize the potential of workers with differing abilities and needs by fitting the right man to the right job, the supporters of the scientific curriculum would fit the right subjects to the right students. As Herbert Kliebard observed, the ideal of educating the individual according to his capabilities has an innocent and plausible ring until one realizes that practically, it meant making dubious judgements about the innate capacities of children to learn and placing them into curricula that fulfilled educators' expectations.[38]

Students must be prepared for a vocation, said the promoters of scientific management, they cannot all be specialists and professionals. What, for example, was the use of algebra and geometry for 95% of the half million high school girls in America? Why, asked Snedden, should 70% of the boys and girls in high school study Latin?[39]

Rightly enough Snedden recognized that standards of the high school amounted to mere snobbism or were relics of an age that no longer served the modern mind. "The masses are growing restive," argued Charters, "under what they consider the useless material taught in the grades."[40] All cannot be professionals, wrote Bobbitt in *The Curriculum* published in 1918, and the misdirected good intentions of teachers who aim for the highest for all their students is harmful in the long run. The doors of opportunity are not equally open to all 20 million students. After fruitlessly preparing for an academic life, 90% must be compelled to labor.[41] "The solution is coming,"

wrote Bobbitt, "not through the impossible plan of lifting all people into the professions, but through lifting all vocations to the social level of the professions."[42]

The argument sounds remarkably similar to one fought by Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Dubois. The issue they struggled over was not only the treatment of black children. The black experience gave insight into a wider historical situation shared by all in American society. But this time there was the promise of a scientific solution that would finally end the debate. "The change is coming," prophesied Bobbitt in 1924, "in an age which is impatient with the primitive methods of guess and whim," ". . . in an age which is demanding that science be placed in control of educational affairs and that scientific methods be employed in formulating the entire program of education."[43]

The scientific basis for finding the fundamental techniques of education, like Taylor's for industry, was found in reducing each activity to its most basic elements. Charters, for example, broke the 12 general types of secretarial duties into 871 specific steps. When asked by Stephens College to create "specific training for the specific job of being a woman" he learned the necessary qualities by sending a questionnaire to women around the country. On the basis of 95,000 replies, 7,300 categories of women's work were isolated. On this foundation, he built his curriculum.[44] Similar studies were undertaken to find which spelling words, which kinds of math and so on were needed in particular career choices. Bobbitt called this process "activity analysis." In substance, it was not too different from Taylor's time-motion studies. According to Bobbit, this was the attempt to find specific types of human activity which people should perform efficiently in particular life situations. For example, it would discover the five to ten thousand words they spell, the several hundred specific practical home activities in which they engage, and so forth. Once this was accomplished, each of the aspects of the curriculum chosen would be divided into still more basic units, to insure the most efficient learnings.

The educational use of Taylor's technique of dividing larger elements of activity into smaller ones, and then using standardized methods to efficiently teach these basic units, was paralleled and augmented by the development of the tools of objective research.

Joseph Mayer Rice is credited with beginning the testing move-

ment in 1897. Convinced that opinions about education were just that, Rice tested the spelling ability of students in various schools in New York City. Rice's methods of testing were simplistic, but more sophisticated methods were soon introduced. In the following decade, Binet introduced the intelligence test and the American psychologist Edward Lee Thorndike developed the achievement test. Thorndike published *An Introduction to the Theory of Mental and Social Measurements* in 1904. Encouraged by his example, several achievement tests were soon developed by others. C. W. Stone published an arithmetic achievement scale; M. B. Hillegas devised measures of the quality of English composition; and B. R. Brickingham introduced a spelling scale. Thorndike also wrote a standard text in the psychology of education and another on school administration.

Thorndike argued persuasively for the use of tests and measurements in all aspects of the school program. "Education is a form of human engineering," he declared, "and it will profit by measurements of human nature and achievement as mechanical and electrical engineering have profited by using the foot, pound, calorie, volt and ampere."[45] For Thorndike and those who followed his lead, tests and measurements promised to give answers to the pedagogical problem faced by the schools. After 1910, educators embraced the testing movement, no longer willing to leave the "betterment of intellect, character and skill to speculation and faith." Instead, Thorndike offered hard-headed realism: "Everything that exists must exist in some amount and if it exists in some amount it can be measured," he said. But if it was realism it was a peculiarly utopian realism for he added, "Not perhaps now and not perhaps in 50 years from now. . ."

This period also saw the emergence of behavioristic psychology, which was built upon the same intellectual foundation and faith in the future advances in science. Impatient with the vagueness of consciousness and introspection associated with psychology, John B. Watson wanted to make it more scientific. By reducing each human action to its smallest unit, that of stimulus and response, he sought to find the principles of human behavior that would permit its rational direction. Experimentalism replaced speculation as Watson denied any role for consciousness in his new psychology. In order to experiment, observed Watson, any problem must be reduced to its simplest terms.

Educators like Bobbitt and Snedden wished to find the optimum

relationships between work and play, directed and undirected learning. Watson argued that the study of behavior would give answers to this educational dilemma. "The problem of the schoolroom and of the laboratory," he wrote, in *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education* "is to find out what an individual can instinctively do and what he can be trained to do and the methods which will lead him most easily and quickly to a given set of ends."[46] This meant in education that the line between the classroom and the playground, the school and the home, and the individual and society, was to be erased in an attempt to organize all life on scientific principles.

An indication of the sweeping acceptance of this solution is seen in the very quantity of studies and testing that was produced. So cumbersome did the amount of material become that surveys became necessary to make sense of the profusion of information that was being processed. Every institution of organized society was subjected to searching scientific inquiry. Called social surveys, these looked at the character of municipal government, housing, and recreation facilities. This survey movement, wrote Charles Judd in *The 37th Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education* was interrelated with and spurred on by the measurement movement.[47] Around 1910, Judd wrote, groups of experts were invited into the school to gather information and provide advice. The experts often conducted extensive surveys. They evaluated the system of supervision, the teaching force and its training, the curriculum, the physical conditions, and other general topics.

Districts, states, and even the nation as a whole conducted surveys. Some were focused on specific issues, others became continuous. That is, a system maintained a bureau of tests and efficiency to monitor progress. This rapid rise in popularity created problems of finding qualified experts willing to do surveys. University professors and their graduate students began to direct and interpret them.[48]

Here is a key to understanding the phenomenal growth of the scientific movement. The movement fed on itself. To ensure the public would continue to support more schools, more surveys were conducted. This required more experts, which called for more specialized training. As the bulk of information became greater, surveys of surveys were needed.

The rationale behind the testing and survey movements was that scientific studies would be a substitute for dictatorial control. Objec-

tive evidence would show certain methods of administration and instruction to be more effective than others. This would enable the public to choose the best for their own district. The assumption was that the local control of schools and the diversity that it provided, would invite experimentation and comparison. This, in turn, would favor scientific studies. Science and democracy would work together, each reinforcing the other.

Unfortunately, democracy did not propel the scientific movement. Its own internal logic did. More studies had to be conducted as more accurate methods of sampling and analyzing the data were devised. For example, more experiments on intelligence had to be conducted after Charles Spearman developed factor analysis. New measures meant more reliable tests and these had to be conducted. The sophisticated measurements also insulated the experts. The public and school administrators came to depend more and more on those who professed to understand such complex materials.

The scientific movement did not, however, live up to the expectations that it had raised. Despite the number of surveys and studies, the results were, for the most part, inconclusive and often contradictory. Similarly, despite the enthusiasm that had accompanied Taylor's early efforts, the results over the years were far less than had been hoped. The system was rarely used beyond the level of trimming costs or to speed working time. Even when honestly attempted, the Taylor system was quickly abandoned. One of the greatest problems was with the planners themselves. Since the efficiency experts were to plan each operation and movement, and then pass directives down to the workers, they were transformed into a bureaucracy. As a bureaucracy, the planners became not the unbiased implementers of science uniting the interests of workers and owners, but a third class. The factory now had three distinct classes each fighting for their own self interest instead of only two. This, of course, also occurred in the survey movement discussed above.

Refusing to believe that the fault was in the vision itself, the supporters of scientific management counseled a redoubling of efforts to be more scientific. The failure of Taylor's system, argued Bobbitt in the *Curriculum*, was that the planners themselves could not foresee all contingencies of the job. By excluding the worker from participation in planning, a key element, the human element, was not being sufficiently used. The science was visible only to management. If the

workers, too, could see the science working, not just unexplained typed directives from anonymous experts, the system would succeed.[49]

Similarly, John B. Watson criticized industry for its use of efficiency experts, in forcing ever more production from workers. The attempts of efficiency engineers to eliminate wasted effort, improve training methods, find proper spacing of rest periods and so on, were all to the good, he said, but the total effect on the worker's happiness and comfort must not be forgotten.[50]

Despite the fact that, as Watson admitted, psychologists were also being used in conjunction with the efficiency experts by industry, his solution was identical to Bobbitt's. A greater effort to be more scientific was the answer to Taylor's failure. This, of course, was the very same argument put forward by Taylor himself almost a decade earlier.[51]

This argument did not convince critics like Boyd Bode who dissented from the faith in efficiency that so permeated the thinking of the time.

In 1927, Bode published *Modern Educational Theories*.[52] He questioned whether scientific studies or scientific methods of constructing curriculum advanced democracy. Democracy was not a word or a simple state of being for Bode. It was a process of continual readjustment in the direction of a more extensive mutual recognition of interests. It was the job of education to humanize the social order to make sure that no one's pursuit of self interest was at the expense of that of another. This was no simple task, Bode conceded. The democratic movement had been interpreted to mean liberation of the individual resulting in emphasis on individual differences, initiative, freedom or self-expression. But, he cautioned, these were not ends in themselves. Bode recognized that this could lead to an encouragement of whim or selfishness or one-sided vocational interests. On the other hand, the over-emphasis of social consciousness could lead to subverting the individual to society.

Bode acknowledged the most severe problem was the problem of direction. Progress does not come from doing the same things better, he said, but from creating new standards. The danger of scientific studies of education was that they obscured the need to create new standards and ideals.

Bode was not opposed to a science of education. He was concerned

that the use of scientific studies and scientific language disguised school people's confusion about the aims of education. For example, Bobbitt's attempt to form the curriculum by determining what experiences the youth must have to prepare them for adulthood sounded alluring. It removed vagueness in goals, brought schools closer to life, and allowed the teacher to specialize and perfect his trade. But, said Bode, Bobbitt's commitment was to a static ideal. His curriculum could not prepare an individual to meet unexpected situations. Nor could he show whether the skills taught were desirable. The method Bobbitt used, said Bode, was essentially a questionnaire. Unanimity may result from such efforts to arrive at consensus, but it was meaningless agreement. Teachers agreed to impart a disposition to obey the law, to recognize obligations, and to hold to high standards. Worse, said Bode, when Bobbitt did teach something, like science, it was so specific and applied it made it impossible to develop the scientific attitude. It was, said Bode, science with science left out.[53]

W. W. Charters' method of job analysis, which determined instructional objectives by analyzing the skills involved in various trades, was also severely limited, according to Bode. It did try to match the school work with the outside world; farmers were not to be given the same course of study as engineers. But, the method led to routinization of tasks making the workman an automaton. Nor could the method provide any insight into the aims of education beyond strictly vocational preparation.[54]

Both Charters and Bobbitt would let the community decide what ideals should permeate the school. This, Bode said, seems to be democratic, but it is a way full of danger. The public is simply not well-enough informed to make such decisions and expect educators to hold to them. Unfortunately, he added, David Snedden's efforts to determine objectives sociologically seemed to reduce itself to the same sort of faith in consensus or simply fell back to undefined canons of judgement such as "good taste."[55]

Bode also cautioned against an overdependence on mental tests, warning that they oversimplified intelligence.[56] In general, Bode saw these problems stemming from a one-sided view of school, a rejection of educational philosophy. Until efforts were directed to think clearly about reinforcing the mind and intelligence of all citizens, Bode feared, educational reform would only mean the destruction of old values for the sake of cheap immediate ends.[57]

Others were equally quick and sure to criticize the tendency of the science of education to become scientism.

John Dewey argued against a narrow vision of science that demanded uniformity of procedure rather than a cultivation of an open and searching attitude for responding to new situations. Such a stance, he wrote in *Sources of a Science of Education,* is a perversion of both science and education. If teaching is viewed as those procedures that produce rapid results, correct recitation, or classroom order, teachers will seek recipes to attain those results. Science will become a guarantee that goes with a purchase, not a light to the eyes.[58]

Dewey cautioned against the temptation to apply experimental findings directly to the classroom. The problems that concern scientists, he said, are found in daily life, but the scientist isolates a problem from its natural environment. As a result the findings do not have immediate practical utility. Dewey suggested the teacher see findings, such as the one that young girls learn faster than young boys, as added information to increase the available alternatives for action. If the teacher immediately separated the girls from the boys, the results would be ludicrous.[59]

Dewey's hope was that as the facts piled up and were connected, they would become a tool for observing the class and various students' reactions. The teacher could take into account remote consequences that he could not have realized before. The teacher's practical dealings would become more flexible. He need not imitate others blindly nor follow tradition alone.

In sum, Dewey said education is not simply teaching skills. The process includes discovering what values are worthwhile and should be pursued as objectives. The sources of a science of education, he said, are those pieces of knowledge which enable the teacher to be more enlightened, more humane; and schools more truly educational. This can only be done within the educational act. And the discovery is never made; it is always in the making. If someone seeks solace in momentary efficiency, or in material that has scientific prestige, Dewey cautioned, he will only lessen the chance that education will advance. He will prevent thinking, which is the source of all progress.[60]

The influence of scientific management and strict behavioral psychology did fade under the growing dissatisfaction with a theory

of education that was based upon a static vision of the school's function as a preparation of the child for a future adult-centered world. A child-centered philosophy of education, with an emphasis upon meeting the needs of the child here and now, gained momentum as the star of scientific management waned. Indeed by 1926, Bobbitt himself seems to have rejected the ideal of the adult-centered school. In the *26th Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, Bobbitt wrote that "Education is not primarily to prepare for life at some future time. In a very true sense," he said, "life cannot be prepared for, it can only be lived."[61]

It would be a mistake, however, to believe that this signalled the decline of the scientific movement. Bobbitt had not repudiated his faith in technology. Although accepting the need for a "moving present" orientation, he continued to underscore its need to be functional.[62] Similarly, Harold Rugg, who had been deeply involved in the testing and measurement movement, wrote a book with Ann Schumaker praising the "new education." The book, published in 1927, was called *The Child Centered School*. Rugg lauded child-centered education because it developed tolerance, creativity and allowed for the natural development of the child. Nevertheless, Rugg also urged the use of controlled experiment and careful planning for the child-centered school. He pointed out that the outline of a technique for measurement in the schools had been produced by the scientific movement. He declared his hope that the new education would continue the trend already begun.[63]

The child-centered school represented a reaction against the neglect of the child's own inner nature for the demands of the larger society. The concern for the child's personal development as a thinking human being meant that schools should gear curriculum and programming to the needs of the child. This meant more freedom for the child, sometimes to the point of denying any responsibility to society at all.

Critics of permissive education like Dewey and Bode said that the child-centered school often lacked any direction, falsely seeing the teaching act as a form of imposition. Child-centered educators, like Margaret Naumburg, the founder of Walden School, attacked Dewey's group psychology and social theory as leading to "a dull and gloomy picture, this Technological Utopia."[64]

Dewey had attempted to maintain a middle course between those

who advocated complete freedom for the child and those who wished to use the school as a means of social reform. Naturally, this middle way made him the target for both camps. But what is revealing about Naumburg's criticism, and in this she is representative of the child-centered movement as a whole, is that her own educational program was strongly built upon the use of therapy. Concern for the development and adjustment of the child meant an emphasis upon the child's individual mental and physical well-being. Faith in social engineering as a means of solving human problems, that brought the sociologist and the school nurse together following World War I, now justified intervention into his private inner life. The therapeutic intervention into the child's life out of a concern for his health and well-being led as surely to the technological society as did intervention for the needs of society.

The rejection of the sense of limits inherent in Dewey's middle course made the debate between the two positions a false one. The old divisions had been overcome. The therapeutic society had replaced them all.

Notes

[1]George Orwell, *The Road to Wigan Pier*. (New York: Harcourt, 1958).

[2]Eric Heller, *The Artists Journey into the Interior*. (Random House: New York, 1965) pp. 16–21.

[3]Peter Drucker, *Men, Ideas and Politics*. (Harper: New York, 1971) pp. 159–171.

[4]Samuel Haber, *Efficiency and Uplift*. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1964), pp. 18–20.

[5]Ibid; 60–65.

[6]Ibid; x

[7]Frederick W. Taylor, *Scientific Management*. (Westport: Greenwood, 1972). See for example "The Principles of Scientific Management" pp. 9–30.

[8]Ibid; 59.

[9]Ibid; 60.

[10]Ibid; "Testimoney" pp. 59–62.

[11]Haber; 35.

[12]Ibid; 51–56.

[13]Ibid; 54.

[14]Ibid; 65.

[15]Taylor, "Shop Management" pp. 185–192.

[16]Taylor, "Testimoney" p. 30.

[17]Ibid; 189.

[18]The attractiveness of this solution for such an astute and bitter critic of the business elite as Thorstein Veblin supports this interpretation. See *The Engineers and the Price System* (Kelly: New York, 1965).

[19]Taylor, "Shop Management" pp. 18–30.

[20]See Raymond Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962).

[21]Franklin Bobbitt, "The Elimination of Waste in Education," *Elementary School Teacher*, 13(6) February 1912, pp. 259–71.
[22]Herbert Kliebard, "Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory," *Freedom Bureaucracy and Schooling*. ASCD Yearbook (D.C.: NEA, 1971) p. 80.
[23]Cited in Kliebard, p. 81.
[24]Ibid; 82.
[25]Franklin Bobbitt, "High School Costs," School Review. 23(8) October 1915, (505–534) p. 506.
[26]Franklin Bobbitt, "A City School as a Community Art and Musical Center," *Elementary School Teacher*. 12(3) November 1911, (119–126) p. 119.
[27]Franklin Bobbitt, "The Elimination of Waste in Education," *Elementary School Teacher*. 12(6) February 1912, (259–271) p. 267.
[28]Ibid; 265.
[29]Ibid.
[30]Ibid.
[31]Ibid.
[32]Kliebard, 84.
[33]David Snedden, *Sociological Determinations of Objectives in Education*. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1921), pp. 44–45.
[34]David Snedden, "Pros and Cons of the Gary System," *N.E.A. Proceedings*, 1915, p. 369.
[35]Ibid; 370.
[36]David Snedden, "What of Liberal Education?" *Atlantic* (109) January, 1912, pp. 111–112.
[37]Quoted in Kliebard, p. 84.
[38]Ibid; 80.
[39]Snedden, "What of Liberal Education?" p. 114.
[40]Quoted in Kliebard, p. 85.
[41]Franklin Bobbitt, *The Curriculum*. (New York: Arno, 1971), pp. 59–63.
[42]Ibid; p. 363.
[43]Franklin Bobbitt, "Curriculum Making," *The Elementary School Journal*. 25(1) Sept., 1924, p. 49.
[44]Cited in Kliebard, p. 85.
[45]Edward L. Thorndike, "Measurement in Education," *Twenty First Yearbook of National Society for the Study of Education*. (Bloomington, Illinois: Public School pub. 1922), p. 1.
[46]Herbert Jennings et al., *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education*. (New York: MacMillan, 1917).
[47]Charles Judd, "Contributions of Social Surveys," pp. 9–20.
[48]Ibid; p. 15.
[49]Bobbitt, *The Curriculum*, pp. 83–84.
[50]John B. Watson, *Psychology from the Point of View of a Behaviorist*. (New York: Lippencott, 1919), pp. 20–24.
[51]Ibid; 12.
[52]MacMillian, New York.
[53]Ibid; pp. 107–108.
[54]Ibid; pp. 102–106.
[55]Ibid; 122–140.
[56]Ibid; 310–327.
[57]Ibid; 348.
[58]John Dewey, *Sources of a Science of Education*. (New York: H. Livright, 1929), p. 15.
[59]Ibid; p. 18.
[60]Ibid; pp. 76–77.
[61]Cited in Kliebard, p. 88.

[62]Franklin Bobbitt, "Orientation of the Curriculum Maker," *26th Yearbook of National Society for Study of Education*. (Bloomington: Public School, 1926), p. 69.

[63]Harold Rugg and Ann Schumaker, *The Child Centered School*. (New York: Arno, 1969), p. 317.

[64]Cited in Clarence Karier, *Man, Society and Education*. (Glenview Ill.: Scott Foresman, 1967), p. 239.

Independent Journal of Philosophy

Revue Indépendante De Philosophie

General Editor: George Elliott Tucker
Editorial Assistant: Susanne Klein
38, rue St.-Louis-én-l'Ile
F-75004 Paris, France

The *Independent Journal of Philosophy* announces the move of its editorial and business offices from Vienna, Austria to Paris, France. Effective immediately, all manuscripts, correspondence and subscriptions should be sent to the following address: George Elliott Tucker, General Editor, *Independent Journal of Philosophy*, 38 rue St.-Louis-én-l'Ile, F-75004 Paris, France.

Prospective authors should also note the following revised schedule of issues: Vol. IV (1980): *Modernity (1)*; Vol. V (1981): *Modernity (2)*; Vol. VI (1982): *Historicism*; Vol. VII (1983): *Eric Voegelin: Essays on the Issues and Themes of his Life-Work*. Deadline for papers is 1 October of the year before the issue in question appears (e.g., 1 October 1981 for Vol. VI). Further information on the themes to be treated, as well as instructions for preparing manuscripts, should be requested from the General Editor.

The Editors
The Independent Journal of Philosophy

Caveat Homo Sapiens: Reason and Unreason

Felix Friedberg
Department of Biochemistry
College of Medicine
Howard University
Washington, D.C. 20059

It might become annoying if many people suddenly embarked on a "thinking routine." They would pose questions constantly, and that would be bothersome. First, they would ask what you mean by any statement you make, leaving you little chance for platitudinizing. They would observe that often two things labeled by the same term may actually be different. In fact, two things are never "infinitely" (i.e., completely) identical but only approximately so. They would find that misunderstandings sometimes occur because statements are taken from their context.

Having clarified meanings—and consideration of the significance of words is necessary—they would inquire next as to whether the "supposed truth" is a "real truth." (A "supposed truth" is capable of being a "real truth" if it allows equation with actuality). They would ask you "How do you know?" You would have to remember that absolute certainty is impossible; that you never have all the facts and that nobody could collect the entire evidence but only what appears to him relevant at a certain time under particular conditions; you would have to admit that there is a limit to the number of facts available. You would begin to replace "either"-"or" statements by "to a degree" expressions. You might metamorphose into an ardent worshipper of the laws of probability.

Thirdly, people would often find you guilty of having applied faulty logic such as "post hoc ergo propter hoc." It is not permissible to assume a relation between two events merely because they follow each other chronologically. Sufficient statistical frequency is mandatory. And even then, there is no way of applying the observed interrelationship to new experiences because the underlying connection between the two events which follow each other has not been discovered. There is also the danger of accepting an erroneous expla-

nation. In scientific inquiry, on the other hand, conditions are varied, the missing law is deduced and happenings in altered circumstances can be predicted.

Your annoyance at people who embark on a "thinking routine" might flare anew when, after having forced you to define your words, to circumscribe the significance of your statements and to examine the validity of your reasoning, they now accuse you of having unconsciously selected evidence which helps you to believe an irrational opinion to which you have succumbed. They will tell you that you have taken the line of least resistance, and that if you were interested in gratifying your desires or in making friends and influencing people, you were doing fine, but that if you intended to think objectively, an analysis of your conclusions in the light of the forces of "unreason" would be mandatory. They would explain to you that in a situation of judgment you are confronted with contradictory information from different sources and that you then have to weigh the evidence provided by your own perception against the knowledge delivered by a variety of persons. Thus, you depend upon information implicitly or explicitly given by others to an infinite degree since your own information for equating with actuality is deficient. They would remind you that many events bombard the individual during a day and that reactions to them are the result of generalizations or prejudgments. Prejudgments exhibit weak resistance to changes. They are reversible since they are mere misconceptions. They collapse in the face of contradictory evidence. They are prima facie opinions. If they become rigid, they are no longer prejudgments but prejudices. Faulty rationalizations are erected to camouflage the latter.

Unreason—the foundation underlying mystery and superstition—is guided by forces other than objectivity, such as discomfort, uncertainty and self-indulgence, which tend to block the process of straight thinking. Whenever unreason is disturbed, it engages all resources at its disposal to restore the original condition, for it prefers the status quo. It strives, therefore, to prevent all further thought by asking us to accept permanently, irrevocably clutched ideas. Unreason does not readily admit errors. It relies on lack of scholastic discipline. It ignorantly assumes to know, it self-righteously denies, and it does not allow consideration of problems with impartiality. Unreason prevents us from learning about ourselves, and the limits to our capacities thus inflating our sense of superiority. It does not listen. It favors the

emotions—it omits what it wants and includes what it desires: it sets its own arbitrary limits. In the place of the real it naively puts an attractive phantasmal form, the insufficiency of which it refuses to admit, thus fostering self-deceit. It abhors exchange of information and restricts us to a narrow existence.

There is, for instance, a discomfort in uncertainty, mystery and doubt. Simplification until "understanding" is reached, will restore the necessary feeling of safety to us. Death, a hauntingly concrete and constant threat to our security, is a mystery man would like to make unreal by accepting life beyond the grave. It might be argued that such beliefs are not an intellectual response to a puzzle, but an explicit act of faith born from an innermost instinctive reaction. To reason thus, is to hide that no facts—pro or con immortality—can be adduced and that to form an opinion on faith alone should be taboo.

There is also in us the desire for the maintenance of self-prestige: "I am more intelligent, more decent and more powerful than the next fellow." Translated into "group" behavior this zealous concern for one's superiority turns into the sentiment of nationalism. Excessive nationalism is not rational. Nationalism makes lawful and praiseworthy that which is to be condemned when happening between individuals. The writing of history is distorted by nationalism: While one nation has a mission the others lie in wait to pounce upon it. Such is the unconscious creed of many historians. Another ally of unreason is conformity behavior, a response to specific social pressures, such as a Northerner transposed to the South might have experienced with regard to race relationships. We want to be approved by society.

Among other forces that aid unreason are the weakness for excitement which makes us accept what is untrue, and the desire to feel morally good which causes us to assume that our everyday actions are unselfish.

One major aim of education should be the disarming of unreason. How can this be done? Socrates employed tactics of cross-examination to expose self-satifying ignorance. Approaching, as a modest inquirer, those who thought that they knew more than he did, he led them to analyze their conduct and forced them to understand the implications of the moral standards by which they evaluated behavior. He awoke in them skepticism that avoids prejudgment and considers evidence.

Reason—like freedom—requires control of both external and in-

ternal factors. We can readily evaluate facts (refuse orders from the outside). But how to overcome the subconscious motivation? (How to resist the orders from within?) The initial step should be the realization that these internal factors exist.

In thinking, there is first the recognition of the problem. Then, from prior knowledge (facts!) an inference is generated involuntarily, i.e., ideas arise "flashlike" as a function of past experience. The inference, in turn, has to be examined either by further thought or heuristically. If found inadequate a new inference must be made. And if several inferences (alternatives) appear simultaneously, a decision will allow selection of the best solution. Unlike formal logic (which is impersonal) thinking (decision making) has reference to previous experience (context) and relates to the person. Hence, it is good practice to examine underlying motives in decision making.

There is orderliness. A sequence of steps, each obeying rules of logic, leads to the endproduct of the process. If the sequence is disturbed, if the inference comes first and thereafter the facts are selected to justify it—the decision maker is the victim of prejudgment or of prejudices. What if there are available quite a few facts for the making of a decision and if these data do not permit the preference of one conclusion or another because the alternatives are even in their degree of attractiveness? One could request additional information. This might not terminate the dilemma, however. One could choose at random (in order to discharge this in limbo feeling) and afterwards bolster the position and devalue the negative arguments. The stronger the conflict before the decision, the greater the effort to justify it, once it is made.

Festinger proposed a theory of "cognitive dissonance" ("cognitive" because the theory deals with relations among items of information; "dissonance" because there is a psychological misfit as far as these items are concerned). A tendency exists to resolve conflict, to reduce dissonance. And evaluations are readjusted.

High schools girls are asked to assess the attractiveness of each of twelve test records. Two records rated "moderately attractive" by a girl are selected and the girl is told she may keep one of them. Upon making her choice she is requested to evaluate all records again. Now the gift record is more attractive and the rejected record is less attractive than before. Similarly, when a person is induced to take a position contrary to his own judgment, he may subsequently show a change of opinion in the direction of the discrepant stand.

Among the potential ways for removing "mental discomfort" one could list: changing one's opinion; distorting the meaning of the opposing point of view; seeking further support of the original position and convincing others that their arguments are wrong. If, however, an individual has no choice but to act in a fashion running counter to his belief, little dissonance is generated.

With such hidden forces intent on minimizing internal conflict and on avoiding a sense of frustration how is it possible to retain confidence in reason? Recognizing pitfalls allows distillation of a "purer truth," i.e., the more the forces influencing judgment are understood, the more "real truth" is extracted from "supposed truth." While the ultimate cannot be achieved, we may get close to it. On the other hand, if one discounts the evidence—if one accepts the "unreasonable" as "reasonable"—the chance of profiting from experience will be nil.

Communication

Interpersonal communication is not merely a tool for getting the cooperation of our fellowmen. It is used to reduce uncertainty: to check our observations against the perceptions of others and to ward off anxiety. For instance, interpersonal communication is employed for confirming one's self-image. We seek information about individuals very similar to us when we have reason to be unsure of our own ability. The self-image, in turn, is the foundation of self-esteem: the basis for defending or strengthening the ego. What is involved here is evaluative feedback to justify the image. Of course, there is always the problem of selective attention: we prefer to choose that which confirms our viewpoint. Communications can be evaded, withdrawn from, misunderstood and doubted. An individual with a high concept of himself would disparage the source of any attack upon his self-image. Evidence about that image received from external sources tends to be modified to fit the person's existing concept of himself. We must make the effort to discuss ourselves sincerely and to accept genuine feedback. We must avoid being defensive, question our own assumption and values, develop insight into our motives and assume responsibility for our behavior.

Interpersonal communication has reached its highest level of actuality if the person you think you are, the person others think you are, the person you think others think you are, the person you would

like to have others think you are, are almost identical with what you actually are. We are not referring here to such performances as those staged by a shill, i.e., a person who pretends to buy something in order to lure onlookers into purchasing the same object in turn, but rather to spontaneous self-presentation. For example, defensive manners are employed when we are guilty. An individual who appears before others will have many motives for trying to control the impression they receive of him.

Communication is, however, also used for gaining information about the environment (i.e., for determining the nature of the world around us) and therein lies the awesome possibility of employing it as a tool for manipulating the masses, for changing their attitudes and beliefs. If managed for such purpose it pollutes the rational response and slants the thinking process. Caveat homo sapiens: to resist the tailored presentation of facts one must be aware of the major variables influencing communication.

The way in which a communication is presented may influence its effectiveness. If inadvertently overheard, the communication is more likely to change the opinion of the listener than if specifically addressed to him, since in the former case, no intention to persuade is suspected. Similarly, a communication is less effective in changing a person's opinion if the individual is forewarned that an authoritative statement advocating a contrary point of view is forthcoming: There exists inner resistance to influence: Hence, it makes a difference if the subject is aware of the intent of the communicator.

Even though an opinion stated first does not necessarily have a greater effect on the receiver, the influence of the order of presentation of a pro and a con communication must be taken into account if the receiver indicates publicly his position after only one side of the story has been described. Don't make a premature commitment. Frequently, we defend stubbornly an opinion during an argument (we have made a commitment) only to reverse our stand and adopt the adversary's opinion at a later occasion, i.e., we are the victims of a subconscious face-saving operation.

Audiences exhibit selective attention: they primarily listen to and read about topics they are interested in—and these are topics on which they already have information and fixed opinions. Those who can be converted are not likely to listen. Those who listen are difficult to convert. If you present an argument first and convince someone, he

might subsequently be inattentive when the counterargument is presented. He has made up his mind. There is a possibility that the "first word" is more decisive than "the last." This tendency to give more weight to an argument presented first may be reduced, however, by warning the individual of such a possibility.

While the order of presentation may play a role if a communication containing two points of view is presented as a unit by one person, this effect is eliminated by employing two different communicators for the presentation of the two opposing views, thus emphasizing the controversial nature of an issue. But is it advantageous to present both sides of an argument or is a one-sided presentation preferred? For convincing those who are initially opposed, inclusion of arguments on both sides appears more effective (an approach that should also be supported on grounds of fairness!). Furthermore, counterarguments might be encountered adventitiously, and strong initial beliefs are more easily retained in the light of counterarguments if they are preexposed to such arguments weakened by refutation.

Frequently, we consider trustworthiness of the source itself and also the appeal to authority (ad verecondiam) or expertness. If the communication has an origin of low credibility, it is more likely that it will be considered biased (at least immediately after the message was delivered since the effect of the source may decrease with the passage of time). If we approve of the source but disagree strongly with the arguments presented by that source—there is either a tendency to divorce the source from the message or a tendency to change our evaluation in order to fit the argument to the source.

Acceptance of a communication is not only influenced, however, by the manner of transmission but also by the characteristic resonance within the mind of the communicatee. What is selected from a communication by one individual is not identical with that extracted by another one since points of view are integrated into value systems derived from past experiences unique for each person. Furthermore, facts are registered and interpreted in terms of an individual's own needs. A point of view may be accepted because of subconscious desires to comply, to please a person or group or because of a need to identify with such a person or group. Fear appeals, followed by recommended solutions for relief, enhance the effectiveness of communications. Variables, such as need for social approval, fear, etc., come under the heading of ego-involvement.

Frameshifts

We do not see three-dimensional objects, a table or a chair, but only successions of two-dimensional pictures. After we have acknowledged a sufficient number of these pictures, we infer that the object is a table or a chair because we know from experience that what we call a table or a chair gives this type of successive impressions. I.e., perception is modified by experience. There is no single perception—rather there is a pattern into which a perception fits. Because of past encounters, subconsciously, we erect assumptions about the world in which we live. As we assume, so we shall perceive. If a percept does not fit these assumptions, we erase them and establish new ones: That is the process of perceptual learning.

Similarly, a thought is integrated into the already existing structure of knowledge within us, and that structure is altered in turn. Information enters the mind not as "raw data" but in associated form and this assimilated information affects the manner in which subsequent information is received. Information is transposed, that is, framed within existing norms. Furthermore, the synthesized pattern is more comprehensive, hence different in character from that of the single thought. The form of the pattern and the mechanism of its integration are unknown to us.

A child meeting a stranger registers superficialities: The stranger's tallness, his weight. . . . An adult notices the stranger's occupation, his social rank. . . . This phenomenon of various observers perceiving the same object against different points of reference we call "frameshifts."

A thought must be placed into the appropriate frame if the thought is to be accepted. Even though this requirement can be illustrated by examples from all activities of the human mind—it is most striking when exhibited in the thinking of scientists because here we expect it least.

When the scientist has accumulated many "little facts" about seemingly trivial matters, these facts coagulate suddenly and precipitate as sweeping verities, as one "good idea" in the mind of the "great" scientist. In this process a frameshift is often required. Louis Pasteur, convinced that fermentation could not take place without the presence of living cells, refused to accept the finding that a chemical substance (enzyme) extracted from the cells could cause sugar to change to alcohol and carbon dioxide. Pasteur's mind was so set on

the part played by his living microorganisms in the world that he could not disabuse himself of the conviction that such a finding must of necessity prove the theory of spontaneous generation. Pasteur could not have discovered enzymes.

Thinking depends on experience, memory and practice. It involves compounding of previously isolated thoughts into a "family of thoughts." Situations eliciting "applicative thinking," (i.e., the type involving utilization of previously acquired experiences which allows a correct solution for a new situation) often occur after the presentation of a succession of problems. For instance, persons given a series of anagrams whose solutions all belong to the identical word category will display a higher incidence of success on subsequent anagrams of the same category compared to persons without the prior exposure. Even if only a single problem is presented, a "family of thoughts" which contains the correct answer is selected while other "families of thoughts" which are not relevant are rejected.

On the other hand, "innovative thinking" results from the integration of previous unrelated experiences. First, a "family of thoughts" has to be created through reinforcement by repetition of newly invoked individual responses. After discovering that the previous mode of reaction is erroneous, what evokes the insight that allows the pairing of a question with the appropriate answer? We do not know! We do not even understand the mechanism of associative memory!

From experiments, such as where the apparatus employed consists of a kind of billiard game in which balls are launched, aimed in various directions around a fixed point and made to rebound, Piaget concluded that a child first reaches a stage when it sees a relationship between the angle of incidence and that of reflection, but does not yet look for the reason, i.e., when the child has not yet discovered the law of equivalence of these two angles, but only takes account of the empirical situations. At a later stage of development, however, calculations of possibilities are followed by a search for the explanation. Wrong hypotheses are discarded. A noncontradictory reason—the right one—is eventually found and finally the latter is verified empirically. Besides experience, memory and practice—"structuring" is involved here. At a certain age, the capacity arises to select systems so that a single factor is varied in order to find the appropriate relationships for superposing propositional logic onto the logic of relations.

There is no easy prescription for how to reappraise and revamp one's point of view (i.e., how to overcome the framework for think-

ing into which a person is strait jacketed) other than to train oneself to make a conscious and conscientious effort to look at things from an entirely different angle. It can be done. Indeed, often it is easier to change a whole skein of related concepts rather than single perceptions step by step since, in the former case, the need to reconcile each new notion with an old one is avoided.

Brainwashing

Culture, class and needs instill collective prejudices into people via the manipulators: such as the government, corporations, churches, schools, unions and other institutions. These normative organizations freeze man into normative beliefs. They ascertain that the manipulatee is doing what the manipulator wants him to do. While the latter has set the course, the former imagines that he has a choice. In actuality, the choice is a sham, since voluntary behavior is a function of environmental consequences. Positive reinforcement creates a situation which a person desires, or it obliterates one which is a bane to him as reward for behavior in line with the manipulator's expectations. In this way, the probability that the manipulatee will again act in that fashion is enhanced. Negative reinforcement removes a desirable situation which the individual wants, or it generates one he does not like, in order to reduce the probability of unacceptable behavior. (Positive reinforcement may lead to action performed "with love," while negative reinforcement may induce fear or neurotic reactions). Such management of behavior is not an innovation in modern society. Awards and punishment have always been employed as reinforcers for particular operant behavior. Indeed, we control each other all the time either by design or accident.

By alleviating a deliberately induced aversive physical condition (such as hunger or lack of sleep) or by providing new friendships after having removed old social support (such as mail) whenever desired opinions are expressed, behavior which displays a favorable attitude towards a political system is reinforced. A special favor granted to an individual induces him to adjust his thinking to justify acceptance of the favor. This is the basis of brainwashing.

The control of thinking by employment of positive reinforcement aids the forces of unreason. Not only does it tamper with whatever limited human dignity and freedom that exists, but it also stymies the efforts to come to grips with "real truth." The practice of behavioral engineering must remain under careful oversight.

Book Reviews

The Sociology of Education

Ann Parker Parelius and Robert J. Parelius
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978
407 pp., $14.95

Reviewed by:

W. Ross Palmer
College of Education
The University of Alabama
University, Alabama 35486

Don't judge *The Sociology of Education* by Ann Parker Parelius and Robert J. Parelius by its cover! Depicted on the front is an obviously old, abused, and probably urban school—on the back, a school that is new, sleek, and rather apparently suburban. To this reviewer, the older school was probably included to connote unhappiness, disorder, frustration—i.e., all things negative. But the newer school—perhaps included as a dichotomy—seems, instead, far too cold and sterile. Happily, however, *The Sociology of Education*, while bound by a rather depressing exterior, seems not to be encumbered with any of the aforementioned negative connotations on the inside.

The work, according to the authors, has five central goals:

1. To reflect portions of the diverse theoretical perspectives from which sociologists have contributed to Sociology of Education;
2. To portray the complexities of the empirical literature accurately while not overwhelming the student statistically;
3. To include an analysis regarding the Sociology of Higher Education;
4. To emphasize the dynamic aspects of educational development in the U.S.; and
5. To include material on policy-oriented issues and research.

These goals, it would seem, have been realized admirably throughout the work.

Criticisms of Parelius and Parelius' *The Sociology of Education*, for the most part, would be minor. Two worth mentioning, perhaps, concern:

1. What this reviewer considers an overstatement (or perhaps a value judgment which is not indicated as such); and
2. What appears to be an oversight based upon information long out of date.

The overstatement/value judgment:

> . . . communities have often seen fit to regulate where teachers might live, whether or not they could drink, date, smoke, marry, go to parties, gamble, or miss church. Most of these abuses have disappeared with time, but many

> teachers are still expected to comply with certain "standards" of appearance and behavior. For example, teachers may be dismissed for their sexual preferences, if these are revealed to be homosexual, or for other assorted indiscretions. (p. 132)

The value judgment of this reviewer is that while the specific regulations listed might currently be considered as "abuses," at least some "standards" of appearance and behavior for teachers are not at all unreasonable, and they, along with "certain indiscretions" probably should fall within the prerogative of the community to regulate.

The oversight:

> The vast majority of black teachers, for example, are hired to teach in predominantly black schools, and although many black children have white teachers and school principals, relatively few white children have black teachers and black principals. (pp. 134–135)

To persons familiar with public schools in the deep South this statement seems somewhat ludicrous, and given its 1966 reference, it probably should not have been included in the work.

Overall, Parelius and Parelius, in ten chapters and 407 pages, present a creditable work in the field. Using language that is clear and easy to understand (though often somewhat too informal, perhaps), the authors effectively deal with numerous topics—among them industrialization, bureaucratization, professionalization, and educational policy. Employing frequent references to the consensus-conflict dichotomy, and, in one section, with a heavy historical emphasis, they provide a comprehensive treatment of these, as well as other aspects of the Sociology of Education.

Because the work is a text in the Sociology of Education, the continuing question which remained on the mind of the reviewer (who, like the Pareliuses, "has been teaching Sociology of Education for several years") was, "Would I use this work as a textbook in my class?"

The answer, it seems, is clear.

I would.

Behavior Modification and "Punishment" of the Innocent: Towards a Justification of the Institution of Legal Punishment

George Schedler
Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner Publishing Co., 1977
110 pp.; $15.25 paper

Reviewed by:

Mitchell Aboulafia
Philosophy & Humanities
University of Houston at Clear Lake City
2700 Bay Area Boulevard
Houston, Texas 77058

George Schedler's book may be viewed in light of two basic questions: Are there systems of social organization and institutions which can eliminate the need for punishment as an institution of social control? Would such systems be preferable to the institution of punishment? To the former his answer is in the affirmative. To the latter question his conclusion is decidedly in the negative regarding the alternatives he takes up: Therapy (a Skinnerian Society) and Telishment (Victimization). The goal of his book is then to show how Therapy and Telishment fail to be superior to what he calls the institution of punishment. I might add that in the "conclusion" to the book he states that he: "had hoped to discuss what could be said in favor of punishment," but that such a goal was not attained.

In order to reveal the deficiencies of Therapy and Victimization Schedler sets up certain distinctions. One of the most crucial is between what he calls C-rules and P-rules. "C-rules are the rules of conduct which specify certain acts as prohibited or required" (p. 23). Failure to abide by C-rules is commonly understood to endanger the well-being of society and/or be morally incorrect. "P-rules . . . provide that the authorities must impose or may impose penalties on offenders, where penalties consist in some pain or disadvantage" (p. 24).

Schedler tells us that he is not interested in discussing actual systems of punishment that we find in the world at the present time. He does not want to discuss the specifics of any system of P-rules or C-rules, nor does he wish to go into the controversy between retributive and non-retributive formulations. This type of material is not necessary for the project he has sought to undertake. What he wishes to do is to evaluate the alternatives to what he labels as the "institution of punishment." An "institution of punishment" may be defined as: "a set of logical characteristics devoid of any of the content which systems of punishment have" (p. 22). It is not to be understood as any given set of punishments devised by a particular legal system; it is the concept of punishment.

Therapy, or Behavior Modification, at first seems to present such an alternative because it would rid a society of (the institution of) punishment as we now understand punishment. Through the techniques of Behavior Mod-

ification this society could be ordered in such a manner as to prevent crimes. Everyone would be conditioned to follow the given C-rules. The result would be the "automatically" good man, as opposed to what we presently experience, "autonomous man."

However, on further reflection we see that "strictly speaking" there would be no conduct rules, C-rules, in a Skinnerian society. What used to be called C-rules would no longer need to be designated, i.e., rules stating what is desired of individuals in terms of conduct would no longer be necessary. People would not need to make decisions regarding regulations; they would be conditioned in advance to do whatever they were supposed to do. There would be no C-rules, hence no P-rules; "where there are no offenses, there can be no penalties" (p. 59). We are now told that "strictly speaking" Therapy is not an alternative to the institution of punishment, because it not only replaces P-rules but C-rules as well, i.e., it is an alternative, not to P-rules, which we were looking for, but to C-rules.

How would a Skinnerian Society fail its own claims? Who will plan the procedures that everyone will have to follow in such a society? Who will program the programmer, as they say. These questions are linked together in Schedler's argument. It is his contention that those who make the plans for such a society will not be conditioned: "Such planning could only be the result of deliberation and choice. . . . The result is that goodness may not be "automatic" at all when we deal with the authorities" (p. 60). In other words, a Therapy Society would end up depending upon an "autonomous" man to make crucial decisions dealing with what types of behavior others are to follow. The results of a Skinnerian Society would contradict its own intentions, i.e., it sought to remove the arbitrariness of the autonomous man but now must rely on just that autonomous man's "free will" to make goodness "automatic."

The other major alternative to punishment that Schedler addresses is Telishment or Victimization. He defines Victimization as: "an institution in which authorities secretly misapply the P-rules, so that penalties are imposed on non-offenders" (p. 76). It has been suggested that a society might opt for Victimization on utilitarian grounds, i.e., punishing the innocent might benefit society as a whole, for example, through the deterring of crime. Victimization represents a true alternative to the institution of punishment that Therapy did not. P-rules are actually replaced with another technique which Schedler calls the "secret penalizing of the innocent" (p. 77). Unlike Therapy, both the institution of punishment and Victimization have C-rules; it is in how they deal with their respective P-rules that they differ.

The following points summarize what Schedler takes to be the consequences of any theory that might be advanced as a justification for Victimization:

1. The suffering of the innocent and the concomitant letting of the guilty go free.
2. The value of character traits, such as trustworthiness, would disappear. Authorities would be concerned with the consequences of actions; traits such as trustworthiness would have value only in terms of consequences.
3. There would be less respect for choice. Individual autonomy could not be respected as it should be in a society with an institution of punishment.

Perhaps the best way to summarize the overall perspective of the author is in the author's own words: "it is not rational to pursue happiness and renounce autonomy" (p. 106), as either advocates of Therapy or Victimization are prepared to do.

The organization of Schedler's work leaves much to be desired. *Behavior Modification and "Punishment" of the Innocent* has the feel of a book put together in a manifestly short period of time. While the two chapters on Therapy and Victimization are reasonably well executed, the "Introduction" and much of the chapter entitled "Preliminaries" are not well formulated. They appear as if they were tacked on to a couple of essays on the subjects of Therapy and Victimization. The style of the chapters on Therapy and Victimization is much more fluent than the other chapters of the book. In the chapter called "Preliminaries" there is a section, "Nature of a Philosophical Inquiry," which reads much more like an appendix than a central section of a well developed argument. Further, there are serious stylistic lapses in the first two chapters. For example: "Such a definition, regardless of its particular form, would have the unwelcome consequences that we are mistaken in thinking, as we quite certainly are not, that some systems which we call "punishment," but which we believe unjust, are systems of punishment at all" (p. 33).

To sum up: While there are some interesting conceptual tools that Schedler formulates in discussing the alternatives to punishment, I suspect this is a book that grew too quickly from a couple of lengthy essays on Therapy and Victimization. I hope that Schedler will reorganize his material and present it to us in a more developed work in the future.

Reaching Out: Interpersonal Effectiveness and Self-actualization

David W. Johnson
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey
Prentice-Hall, 1981
308 pp.; $9.95 paper

Reviewed by:

Avraham Scherman
College of Education
University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma 73019

Having used *Joining Together: Group Theory and Group Skills* by David W. Johnson in my group counseling class for two years, I was eager to read the second edition of *Reaching Out: Interpersonal Effectiveness and Self-actualization* by David W. Johnson. The similarity of the subject matter in both books led me to expect repetition and much overlapping. To my great surprise I found this book to be a new and unique experience, a completely independent unit. It is evident that this book is a labor of love.

The purpose of this book is to help the reader understand and acquire interpersonal skills. The author classifies these skills into the following four broad areas:

1) *Knowing yourself and your reactions, and developing a trusting relationship*. The chapters on "self-disclosure" and "developing and maintaining trust" attempt to deal with these skills. Self-disclosure is a mode of interaction which facilitates two people getting to know each other, an essential ingredient in developing a relationship. Following this stage in developing a relationship, trust should be established. High acceptance, support, openness, sharing and cooperativeness in a relationship are indicative of interpersonal trust, according to the author.

2) *Accurate and unambiguous communication*. These skills are examined through units explaining communication and verbal and non-verbal expression of feelings and emotions. Interpersonal communication is, according to David W. Johnson, a *message* sent by a *sender* to a *receiver* through some means he calls a *channel*. When the receiver interprets the message as it was intended by the sender, the communication is effective. To improve communication skills, a series of exercises are presented including one- and two-way communication, listening, meaningful responding, personal and relationship statements, understanding the other person's perspective and discriminating among effective and ineffective communication. To assist in verbalizing feelings the reader is taken through a five-step process: gathering information through the senses–*sensing, interpreting* the meaning of the information, identifying a *feeling*, deciding how one *intends* to express the feeling and finally *expressing* it. Expressing feelings constructively and checking perceptions of another person's feelings are among the exercises suggested in order to acquire skills in this area.

Non-verbal cues such as tone of voice, facial expression, and eye contact are discussed, followed by exercises intended to facilitate an awareness of how these cues affect communication. According to the author, it is important to have congruence between verbal and non-verbal responses.

3) *Mutual acceptance and support* is the focus of chapters dealing with listening, responding, and accepting self and others. Johnson points out that there are two basic components involved in listening and responding to others: one's intentions and attitudes, and the way responses are actually phrased. According to the author there are five ways of listening and responding: advising and evaluating (E), analyzing and interpreting (I), reassuring and supporting (S), questioning and probing (F), and paraphrasing and understanding (U).

Self acceptance is related to self-disclosure, personal psychological health and acceptance of others. In terms of accepting others the author states that there are two types of acceptance: antecedent and consequent. He presents two skills: paraphrasing and expressing of warmth and liking as essential in communicating acceptance of others.

4) *Constructive resolution of conflicts and problems*. Skills here include defining and resolving conflicts, confrontation, negotiation and managing one's feelings.

Whenever an action by one person interferes with the actions of others an interpersonal conflict occurs. According to the author, conflicts can be viewed as being constructive when utilized appropriately. Five styles of managing are presented: the turtle (withdrawing), the shark (forcing), the teddy bear (smoothing), the fox (compromising) and the owl (confronting).

In an effort to resolve conflicts constructively one must have an accurate perception of the factors involved, communicate clearly with the other party, build a trusting climate, and have the skills to structure alternatives to resolve the conflict. The reader is taken through a step-by-step programmed approach on how to define conflicts constructively.

When confronting another person and negotiating an end to a conflict, one goes through several phases: from confrontation to defining the conflict, through communication and coordination to reaching an agreement.

The author concluded with a chapter on managing anger, stress and feelings. Seven rules are provided to manage anger constructively. Stress should be managed through social support systems involving people who have an interest in you. Feelings should be dealt with by reducing one's irrational assumptions thus freeing energy for enhancing a relationship.

All interpersonal skills examined in the book are summarized, and an exercise is provided to make one aware of the types of relationships discussed and the various ways in which to apply the skills presented in the book.

All the skills necessary to perform effectively in these four areas are

presented using an "experiential learning cycle" beginning with reflection on personal experiences. New concepts and principles are then formulated which lead to hypotheses to be tested in future new situations.

Each chapter begins with a cognitive description of the concepts to be presented, followed by short self-tests to check the understanding of the reader. Several group exercises are then presented to allow experiential learning and exploration of the concepts presented.

This reviewer has some mixed feelings about the theoretical and research foundations upon which the book is based. There is no mention of evaluative procedures designed to measure the effects of this experience on participants. The author provides an extensive program for enhancing interpersonal effectiveness; however, he gives no indication as to whether it can stand the scrutiny of a scientific investigation.

"Reaching out" is a valuable book for the group practitioner. It can serve as a text for a group dynamics course or possibly be used as a resource for growth group activities.

Books Received

Arbuthnot, Jack B. and Faust, David. *Teaching Moral Reasoning: Theory and Practice*. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1980. iii–xiv, 289 pp., (no price).

Bahm, Archie J. *The Philosopher's World Model*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1979. xi, 295 pp.; $22.95.

Johnson, David W., *Reaching Out: Interpersonal Effectiveness and Self-Actualization*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1980. v-xi, 308 pp.; $9.95.

Kurtz, Paul. *A Secular Humanist Declaration*. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1980. 29 pp.; $1.95 paper.

Journal of Thought
Index

Volume 15, Numbers 1–4, 1980

No. 1 **Spring 1980**

THE SCRIBE
Lloyd P. Williams ..... Page 3

ON PRAGMATISM AND EXISTENTIALISM:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR DUNCAN
Kenneth Winetrout and William H. Fisher ..... Page 7

EMERSON ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE:
THE QUESTION OF AN IMMORAL LAW
Patrick K. Dooley ..... Page 11

ALICE MOORE AND THE KANAWHA COUNTY
TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY
Joe Kincheloe ..... Page 21

HOW A CITIZEN ORGANIZATION CAN
INFLUENCE POLICY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
Lewis Aptekar ..... Page 35

PROPAGANDA, BEHAVIORISM AND CONSCIENCE
Richard Nelson ..... Page 45

UNREAL WORK: MIDDLE CLASS HERITAGE
Robert Beum ..... Page 53

EDUCATIONAL IMAGINATION AND
PUBLIC LAW 94–142
Joseph Watras ..... Page 67

THE HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF
WILLIAM HEARD KILPATRICK
Donald D. Chipman and Carl B. McDonald ..... Page 71

PROPHESY AND PREDICTIONS OF MANAGEMENT
AND ORGANIZATION: VISIONS FROM THE
PAST AND THE FUTURE
Grady M. Spears ..... Page 85

ON PLAYING DICE WITH THE UNIVERSE:
PROBLEMS IN THE USE OF RANDOM NUMBER
TABLES IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
Robert Ragland ..... Page 93

No. 2 **Summer 1980**

THE SCRIBE
Richard Wisniewski ..... Page 3

ON MORAL EDUCATION
Daniel L. Wick ..... Page 7

EQUALITY IN SEXUAL BEHAVIOR: IMPACT ON MAN-WOMAN RELATIONSHIPS
Richard H. Dana ..... Page 9

FROM THE CRYSTAL PALACE TO DOSTOEVSKY'S GRAND INQUISITOR: SOME REFLECTIONS
William J. Schoenl ..... Page 19

DOSTOEVSKY AND EXISTENTIALISM: AN EXPERIMENT IN HERMENEUTICS
Patrick L. Bourgeois ..... Page 29

PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERAL ARTS EDUCATION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO LIFE
Edmund C. Nuttall ..... Page 39

PHILOSOPHY AND "ALTERNATIVE HUMANISTIC EDUCATION": BUBER AND NEILL IN CONTRAST
Peter M. Collins ..... Page 47

EXPOSITORY WRITING: "SHOULDS" FOR THE 1980s
Hugh C. Black and W. Augustus Davis ..... Page 63

KENYAN SCHOOL AND CULTURE
Henry D'Souza ..... Page 69

No. 3 **Fall 1980**

ANTHROPOLOGICAL FIELDWORK: COMMENTS ON ITS VALUES AND LIMITATIONS
Murray and Rosalie Wax ..... Page 1

ETHNOGRAPHY AND EDUCATION: LIMITATIONS AND SOURCES OF ERROR
George Overholt ..... Page 11

MARGARET MEAD'S EARLY FIELDWORK: METHODS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION
Teresa Scott Kincheloe ..... Page 21

ETHNOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES IN EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION: AN ILLUSTRATION
David Fetterman ..... Page 31

THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF COLLEGIATE TEACHING: BRIDGING THE STUDENT AND ACADEMIC CULTURES
W. T. Morrill and D. M. Steffy ..... Page 49

STUDENT AND FACULTY CULTURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A RESEARCH NOTE
Michael Logan and Alanson A. Van Fleet ..... Page 77
ESTABLISHING THE UNITARY CLASSROOM: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND SCHOOL CULTURE
Elizabeth M. Eddy and Joan H. True ..... Page 81
THE CIVILIZING OF CHILDREN: HOW YOUNG CHILDREN LEARN TO BECOME STUDENTS
Margaret D. LeCompte ..... Page 105
ADULT SCHOOLING AND ACCESS TO SOCIETY: A BRAZILIAN COMMUNITY STUDY
James Lynn Buschman ..... Page 129

No. 4 **Winter 1980**

MANUFACTURING AND MERCHANDISING: THE NEW PEDAGOGY
Deborah H. Soles ..... Page 3
ADMINISTRATIVE SURVIVAL IN A SUBURBAN SOCIETY
G. Arthur Rowley ..... Page 9
THE FUTURE OF SCHOOLING
Paul Nash ..... Page 17
ACCOUNTABILITY—A TECHNOLOGICAL VIEW OF EDUCATION
Young Pai and Jack Krueger ..... Page 27
FROM FRISCO TO DISCO (1960–1980): THE CULTURAL LEGACY OF PROTEST
Howard Wolf ..... Page 37
TITANS CLASHING: THE ART OF SCIENCE AND THE SCIENCE OF ART
Robert Hauptman ..... Page 53
GRADES AS FORMS OF SUMMARY NOTATION
John B. Bennett ..... Page 65
CHINA 1980—EDUCATION FOR "THE FOUR MODERNIZATIONS": IMPRESSIONS OF EDUCATION IN TRANSITION
Arthur G. Wirth and Basil J. Reppas ..... Page 69
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR ..... Page 111

BOOK REVIEWS

Volume 15 No. 1 **Spring 1980**

THE BRETHEN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT; by Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong
David W. Levy ..... Page 99

MEN OF IDEAS; by Bryan Magee
David Snelgrove ..... Page 103

ESSENTIALISM: AN ANNOTATED READING LIST ON THE SUBJECT
Paul Rux ..... Page 105

No. 2 **Summer 1980**

MILITANT ISLAM; by G. H. Jansen
Terry Hammons ..... Page 77

THE HIDDEN PROFESSORIATE; Arthur S. Wilke, ed.
Raj P. Mohan ..... Page 81

FANTASY AND COMMON SENSE IN EDUCATION; by John Wilson
Edward J. Furst ..... Page 83

EDUCATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL; by Steven M. Cahn
Bruce Beezer ..... Page 85

PARADOXES OF EDUCATION IN A REPUBLIC; by Eva T. H. Brann
Robert R. Sherman ..... Page 88

No. 4 **Winter 1980**

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT; by Robert Ardrey
Ronald B. Childress ..... Page 91

VIOLENCE; by Jerome A. Shaffer
John Howie ..... Page 99

THE SHAPING OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY: SUBCARPATHIAN RUS', 1848–1948; by Paul Robert Magocsi
Michael V. Belok ..... Page 103

GLOBAL POLITICS; by James Lee Ray
Joseph S. Roucek ..... Page 105

THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST; by Charles L. Schultze
Stephen W. White ..... Page 106

NATIONALISM AND THE CRISES OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN ASIA; Tai S. Kang
Joseph S. Roucek..... Page 109



The *Seated Scribe* from the V Dynasty, Egypt (ca 2500 BC). The scribe was the model of the educated man in ancient Egypt. His role was to preserve and disseminate knowledge. The *Journal of Thought* is a forum for the modern scribe.